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III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has statutory jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(i), Utah Code Annotated.

However, as argued alter in the brief,

John denies that the appeal is timely, or that the issues appealed
were properly certified.

If that is determined to be the case, the

Court would be denied jurisdiction based on timeliness only.

See

also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IV.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Can a party to a stipulated custody d e c r e e
later attack it and appeal from it?
Legal question, judged for correctness.
bars attack or appeal.
(Utah 1966); Ebert

II.

Dury v. Lunceford,

v. Ebert,

Settlement of a case

18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662

744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987).

Must the trial judge enter comprehensive

Findings in a custody determination arising from
default and stipulation?
Legal question, correction of error standard.
discretion as to adequacy of specific findings.
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987).

vi

But abuse of

Ebert v. Ebert,

744

III.

When a litigant tells the court that she

gives up, is it appropriate to allow her attorney to
withdraw her answer and proceed by default?
Discretion afforded to t r i a l court i s broad in child custody
awards.

IV.

Maughan v. Maughan,

770 P . 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 (Utah App.

Was the appeal timely?

1989).

Assuming to

specific time limitation was exceeded, does the
doctrine laches protect a two year old custody
decree from attack?
As to time limitations, a question of law reviewed de novo,
v. smith,

793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).

smith

As to laches, abuse of

discretion standard.

V.

Was the trial court's custody award an

abuse of discretion?
Discretion afforded t o t r i a l court i s broad in child custody
awards.

Maughan v. Maughan,

7 7 0 P . 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 (Utah App.

1989).

VI. Can evidence which is several months old
be deemed to be "newly discovered" for purposes
of a motion to alter or amend?
Mixed question of law and fact, applyinq Rule 52, URCP.
(Utah App. 1989).
vii

VII.

If there is no newly discovered evidence,

does an improper motion to alter or amend a
judgment extend the time for appeal?
Question of law, applying Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and Rules 52 and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

VIII.

Does appeal time on a custody award

run from the date of the custody decree, or from
the denial a year later of a motion to set it aside?
Question of law, applying Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and Rules 52 and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

IX.

Where a Petition to Modify custody is

pending, absent certification for appeal, is denial
of a motion to alter or amend an order refusing to
set aside a custody decree an appealable order?
Question

of

law, applying

Rule

54, Utah

Rules

Civil

Procedure.

V.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

All of these authorities are included in the Appendices and are
therefore not set forth verbatim here.

viii

VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
INTRODUCTION

This appeal is an assault on a custody award that is beyond
attack, both legally and factually.

The Findings of Fact,

conclusions

of Law and a custody Decree were entered by the trial court only after
Karen's counsel agreed to them and approved them by his signature in
November, 1991. Even if the time period within which she could have
asked the court to consider setting aside the judgment had

not

already passed, her actions and those of her attorney waived any
defect she might have otherwise claimed.

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Stripped of irrelevancies, this is essentially an appeal from
the motion

of Defendant/Appellant

Karen

Thompson

(hereinafter

"Karen"), seeking to set aside a 2 year old stipulated custody
decree, granting sole permanent custody of the parties1 daughter,
now age five, Deborah Putvin-Thompson (hereinafter "Deborah"), to
Plaintiff/Appellee John C. Putvin (hereinafter "John").
John

and

Karen

are

Deborah's

natural

parents.

Their

relationship was a union of conscience, based on a belief in the
religious fundamentalist practice of plural marriage.

John and his

wife Donna took Karen as a plural wife, and a few years later Karen

1

gave birth to Deborah.

Karen and Donna, who lived side by side,

both shared with John, by agreement, the care of and bonding with
Deborah.

John has since abandoned the practice of polygamy.

This case began one night in May, 19 91, when Karen absconded
unilaterally with Deborah, then age 3, and John sought through the
justice system to continue raising Deborah.

He received sole

permanent custody by stipulation and decree in 1991, and now, much
later, Karen wishes to undo the agreement-

Deborah has lived with

John and Donna for more than half of her young life.

In the

meantime, there was a multiple day trial on the issue of visitation.
R. 709-715, transcripts of trial included in record on appeal. The
trial changed visitation but not custody.

B.
1.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Complaint.

John filed a complaint against Karen in May,

1991 and later amended it. He prayed for custody of Deborah, then
age 3, asked for an injunction against Karen from removing Deborah
from Salt Lake County, and for other relief. R. 2-6, 161-165. When
he filed, Karen had absconded with

Deborah while John slept, and

was concealing her somewhere in the northwest United States and
Canada.

Id.; R. 9-12.

The case was assigned to the Honorable

Timothy R. Hanson, Third District Court, Salt Lake County.1
2.
1

Restraining Order.

Concurrent with filing of the initial

Initially Judge Leslie Lewis was assigned, but she

g r a n t e d J o h n f S u n o p p o s e d Motion for Recusal.
2

R.

179.

complaint, t h e Honorable S c o t t D a n i e l s e n t e r e d an ex parte
Restraining

Order and Order to Show Cause.

R.

15-16.

Temporary

Karen and

her

family were ordered to refrain from holding Deborah outside Salt
Lake County, concealing her from her father John, or
interfering with his custodial rights. R.

otherwise

16. Karen was ordered

to appear on May 30, 1991 to show cause why the restraining order
should not become a preliminary injunction.
3.

Show cause hearing.

Karen failed to appear before Third

District Court Commissioner Michael S. Evans as ordered by Judge
Daniels.
and

her

However,

Her attorney, Chase Kimball, appeared on behalf of Karen
relatives.

because

Recommendation

Karen's

and

family

Temporary

and

Order,

associates

R.

235-238.

were

still

successfully concealing her and Deborah from John, he was unable to
accomplish personal service of the order upon Karen.
4.

Contempt.

R. 9-12.2

When Karen failed to appear and continued to

hide his child, John moved for a contempt finding.

Commissioner

Evans, though, found that service was not adequate.
Since the Court holds that she was not personally served
with the Temporary Restraining Order, Karen Thompson
cannot be held in contempt . . . , despite having
continued to hold Deborah . . . outside the jurisdiction
of the Court. The fact that [Karen] had actual notice of
the restraint against withholding Deborah from [John], and
of the hearing, but did not appear or comply, does not
create contempt in the absence of personal service.
jRe commendation

and Temporary

Order,

June 25, 1991, p. 2 R. 236. 3

Service was made on Karen's family, others from her
religious group and also at her last known address.
3

John timely rejected the recommendation, but Judge did
not reverse this recommendation. Id. at R. 236 and 237.

3

5.

Temporary custody (initial)*

custody to Karen.

R. 236.

Evans awarded temporary

To get the court to restrict John to

limited, supervised visits, her counsel stated that John presented
a risk of flight with Deborah4, falsely calling him a violent
criminal.

R. 236.

Karen's allegations were serious enough that

despite the lack of any specific claim of violence by John, the
supervision was extremely restrictive. John was required to pay the
cost of using health care professionals to supervise his first
several visits with Deborah after Karen brought her back to Utah
under court order.

The irony is that John ended up with sole

permanent custody, and Karen's visitation was initially supervised
to prevent harm to or abduction of Deborah by Karen.

This temporary award to Karen, an absent

paroat who was still concealing Pe&orah in
knowing contempt of court, illustrates the

''possession is everything* tendency to
maintain the status quo that seems to exist
in Tkird District court* This unwritten,
pervasive policy encourages steeling away by
night with the childt as happened here*
Attorneys who handle domestic cases in Utah
know to advise clients that usually physical
de £actv custody at the start of a case
translates into <te iw» temporary custody/
which in. turn nearly always becomes permanent
legal custody, Fortunately, after great
effortr that outcome was reversed here*

6.

Pretrial matters. Many depositions were taken in the case,

4

She also called John a violent criminal, e.g. R. 94-133
This character attack was later discounted entirely. See, e.g.
polygraph test of Dr. Raskin, attached to Findings, R. 419-470.

4

and from May to November, 1991 it was very hard fought by both
sides.

See generally, R. 1 through 413.

7.
(at

Guardian ad litem.

John's

expense5),

The court appointed a guardian ad litem
to

independently

represent

Deborah's

interests. Arnold Gardner, attorney with Littlefield and Peterson,
was appointed by stipulation of the parties. R. 239-241. From that
point on all agreements parties were approved by Mr. Gardner.
8.

Custody Evaluator.

Early on, the court ordered a custody

evaluation, again at John's expense. The parties stipulated to use
Dr. Patricia Smith, who was appointed by the trial court.6
241.

R. 39-

Dr. Smith did a thorough evaluation, with extensive testing

and hours with the parties and others.

John suggested and she

requested a polygraph test to determine whether Karen's accusations
had any basis (which was performed upon John by Dr. David Raskin,
University of Utah).

The parties stipulated that Dr. Raskin would

do the testing, and the results would be admissible
proceeding in the case. R. 335-336. The results were

in any

incorporated

into the evaluation and the eventual stipulated Findings of Fact.

Id.

They showed Karen's fear to be unfounded.
9.

Stipulated custody change*

Dr. Smith strongly recommended

that custody be permanently awarded to John, and expressed strong
concerns about Karen's mental state and a possible future abduction

Although John has had to pay for virtually everything in
this case, including other professionals, Karen's costs have been
covered mostly by tithes of the Apostolic United Brethren.
6

Supplemental

Karen's counsel recommended Dr. Smith, and John agreed.
Temporary

Recommendation

& Order,

5

R. 239-241.

by her. The parties then stipulated to change temporary custody to
John, which was reduced to an order giving him temporary custody.
R. 335-336, 351-352. Defense counsel Chase Kimball referred Karen
to mental health therapy.

Since September 1991 (some 2 and a half

years) John has had continuous physical custody of Deborah.7
10.

Karen's letter.

On November 4, 1991 Karen

delivered to

John, the court, counsel and the guardian ad litem a very disturbing
letter,

the

contents

of

which

contributed

to

Conclusions and Decree limiting Karen's visitation.
copy is attached as Appendix A.
a.

the

Findings,

R. 419-470. A

In it, she:

Relinquishes permanent custody of Deborah to John;

b. States that she continues to have the same fears that
caused her to secretly take Deborah away.
c. Announces that the court system is evil, and implies
that she will seek extra-judicial relief.
d.
11.

In essence, announces her default and surrender.

Id.

Court Conference. Judge Hanson ordered counsel to appear

by phone at a scheduling and settlement conference on November 12,
1991. R. 370-371. Participating were Judge Hanson, Karen's counsel
Kimball, John's counsel (undersigned) and Mr. Gardner,
attorney.

R. 414.8

Deborah's

The court had before it Karen's letter

announcing and accomplishing her default.
12.

Default.

Mr. Kimball orally withdrew Karen's Answer and

Counterclaim and the court proceeded by default. R. 415, 419.

7

During that entire time, John has never requested nor has
Karen ever paid any child support, and that remains the case.
8

See Affidavit of Arnie Gardner, attached as Appendix C.
6

13•

Findings and Custody Decree*

At that time respective

counsel, including Deborah's guardian ad litem,

agreed on behalf of

their respective clients that Findings, Conclusions and a Decree be
entered, giving sole permanent custody to John.

Id.

The parties

also concurred (and the Court ordered) that Karen's visitation be
supervised, due to emotional difficulties typified by her November
4 letter.

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions

and a Custody

Decree

were entered

to that effect the next day, November 13, 1991. R. 415-470. A copy
of the findings and decree are included as Appendix B.

As entered

in the record, the findings attached and incorporated the custody
evaluation and November 4 default letter.
14.

R. 415-470.9

Evidence and support for findings.

The Findings and

Conclusions, by stipulation of the parties, incorporate Dr. Smithfs
court ordered custody evaluation and Karen's default letter as
supporting evidence.

In total they occupy 55 pages of record.

Before Judge Hanson entered the Findings of Fact, conclusions

Id.

of Law and

custody Decree, Karen's attorney, Mr. Kimball, signed each, approving
them as to form and content.

Id., Appendix B.

Tiie following procedural history relates
to post-judgment events. They are
important as to Kare&'s attempt to set
aside the judgment and then to alter or
amend denial of ttiat motion. They also
relate r however f to Karen*s current
claim tkat, in retrospectt Mr, &i«&all
was not really her attorney.

9

Those attachments, while very important, are not included
in Appendix B. The letter is Appendix A. The custody evaluation
is too large to conveniently include. R. 415-417.

7

15.

No challenge to result*

Karen never withdrew the letter

nor appealed the decree. This is not surprising since she agreed to
the terms through her attorney. No effort was made to set aside the
decree until well over five months after it was entered.
16.

Kimball representation*

Chase Kimball appeared for Karen

from the May, 1991 outset of this case, R. 94, with an appearance
in writing and in open court before she returned Deborah to Utah.
The record attests that he continued to represent her until his
April 30, 1992 withdrawal. R. 642-643. He withdrew 5 months after
stipulating to default and approving the Decree for Karen.
17.

Letter.

In the November 4 letter announcing Karen's

decision to stop fighting (the courts "are not courts of justice"
but are controlled by money), she acknowledges who her attorney is.
"I am going against the advice of Chase [Kimball]" in giving up.
She wrote nothing about discharging Kimball.
18.

Kimball Letter.

Appendix A.

On November 19, 1991 (a few days after

the custody Decree was entered), Mr. Kimball wrote to Judge Hanson as
Karen's attorney.
19.

R. 471-476.10

Further filings on Karen's behalf.

Kimball continued his

very active representation in the case, filing:
*

January 27 Notice

*

January 30, 1992 Motion

20.

of Hearing

and Change of Address.

for

Expedited

Kimball affirms his authority.

10

Hearing

R. 484, 485.

- R. 489-490.

On January 31, 1992 Mr.

The oddness of Kimball's letter to the court evidences
that it was drafted with Karen's approval. In addition to the
letter, between the November decree and January 31, 1992 he filed
2 other documents as Karen's counsel. R. 484 and 489.
8

K i m b a l l f i l e d on K a r e n ' s b e h a l f h i s Memorandum in Support
Strike

and Motion

Authority,

for

Sanctions

along with

a

- Response

related

to Motion

motion

and

of Motion

to Require

Proof

to
of

sworn affidavit.11

Appendix D; R. 499-503. Karen (through him) stated:
[AJttached hereto is the affidavit of Chase Kimball
stating his representation of the defendants has continued
from the time he answered the original complaint. . . .
[T]his author will produce his client. Karen Thompsonr at
a hearing . . . , and the Court may satisfy itself that
she is represented by the author at that time.
Id., Appendix D, R. 501-502 (emphasis added).

Karen and Kimball are

shocked that anyone would question that Mr. Kimball has always been
Karen's attorney.
absurd".

Any doubt about that, they say, are

"patently

They seek sanctions against the undersigned for saying

otherwise, stating
intellect."

Id.

that

it

should

be

"clear

to

the dullest

This was weeks after Mr. Kimball stipulated on

Karen's behalf to withdraw her answer and settle the case.
21.

Court appearance. On February 3, 1993, 2 1/2 months after

he and Karen now say in hindsight that they think he was de facto
discharged, Kimball met with the undersigned in Judge Hanson's
chambers, asking on behalf of Karen for an expedited hearing and
(again) for sanctions against the undersigned attorney.

2-3-92 Min.

Entry, R. 505. Importantly, the record shows that Karen appeared at
this hearing with her attorney, Mr. Kimball.
22.
*

Continued representation.

Id.

Kimball then filed for Karen:

February 10 motion for unsupervised visitation.

11

R. 515.

John's undersigned counsel had filed a Motion to Require
Proof of Authority pursuant to Section 78-51-33, Utah Code. R.
506-507. That precipitated the documents in Appendix D.
9

*

February 13 r e q u e s t f o r r u l i n g on motion, and Memorandum in

Opposition

*
Response

to Motion to Relieve

Guardian ad litem.

R.

516-520.

March 23, 1992 o b j e c t i o n t o proposed o r d e r , R. 543-544, a l s o
to Plaintiff's

Motion for Psychological

*
March 3 0 , 1992
Credentials.
R. 5 7 7 - 5 9 2 .

*

Karen's

Request

Evaluation.
for

Ruling

R.

548-549.

and Proffer

April 14, 1992, Kimball approves order for Karen.

of

R. 807.

* April 27 Karen's motion (again), ex parte, for sanctions
against John and his undersigned attorney (alleging witness
tampering), R. 609-631, accompanied by long, caustic memo. Id.
23.

Withdrawal*

R. 642-643.12

time.

voluminous file.

April 30 1992 Kimball withdrew —

the only

Only then did Karen retrieve from him her

R. 643.

The same day Kimball sent the court a

copy of a letter he wrote for Karen's to psychologist Robert Howell,
then newly appointed by Judge Hanson to evaluate Karen.
The

next

Counsel.
24.

day, May

1, John

filed

a Notice

to

Appear

R.

or Appoint

644.
New

R. 645. Karen lacked counsel for only a week.
Daniel Darger appears for Karen, May 8, 1992.13 R. 651.

T&$ following is the b&giming
of Karen'©
effort to attaok the Custody Decree,,
entered namely six mmths earlier and not
attacked aatli May, 1S92*

25.

First attack on Decree,

May 26, 1992 (6 months after

12

This occurred after Mr. Kimball derided Karen for making
a false police report, claiming John had stolen a car from Karen.
13

Mr. Darger has never filed an actual appearance in this
case. R. 651. The appearance attached to Karen's appeal brief
was captioned for a separate personal injury case.

10

permanent custody award).

Darger filed Karen's Motion to set Aside

Default Judgment, one of the motions whose orders are appealed from.
R. 658-704, Motion R. 707-708, Addendum R. 719-731.
26.

Trial.

At a multi-day trial in May through July, Karen

had the opportunity to prove she had bettered herself and was
prepared for unsupervised visitation.

R. 709-715, transcripts of

trial included in 7 volumes in the appeal record, 1517-2334.
27.

Testimony.

On May 9 and July 8, 1992 Karen testified

supporting motion to alter visitation under Decreer claiming for the
first time that Kimball acted without authority.
28.

Modification. Judge Hanson liberalized visits, though not

as much as Karen requested.
2280.

R. 2170-2171.

Bench ruling, July 16, 1992, R. 2260-

There was litigation over the appropriate content of the

resulting visitation order.
29.

See, e.g. R. 855-882, 893-894.

Findings and Order.

December 10 1992, a year after the

original decree, Judge Hanson made Findings of Fact, conclusions
on Defendant's

Motion to Modify Visitation,

Motion to Modify visitation.

of Law

R. 1125-1131, and his Order on

R. 1132-1137.

The order eased Karenfs

visitation restrictions, but left permanent custody with John.

Id.

Like the original, this was not appealed.
30.

Court denies relief from Decree.

Comprehensive November

18, 1992 Memorandum Decision, R. 1008, March 11, 1993 order.
1362.

R.

This is said to be one of the orders Karen appeals from.
31.

Petition to Modify*

On December 15, 1992 John petitioned

the court to modify the custody Decree and supplemental,
visitation.

R. 1140-1149.

liberalized

John requested certain injunctive
11

relief, relating primarily to Karen's then current psychological
state, relocation to Wyoming and renewed polygamist practices, and
their effect on Deborah during visitation,.14

Id.

3ahn*s petition
to Modify is still
pe&dincf and unresolved, and was pending
when Karen filed this appeal •

32.
Modify.

Motion to Dismiss*

Karen moved to dismiss the Petition to

The motion was fully briefed, then stricken for failure of

defense counsel to appear at the hearing he arranged.
33.

New motion*

R. 1364.

On March 24, 1993, 16 months after entry of

the Decree, 6 months after denial of her first motion for relief, 6
months after entry of the modified decree, 4 months after receiving
"new" evidence from Mr. Kimball, 4 months after the court granted
her own motion to modify visitation, and 13 days after the formal
order denying her relief from the original decree, Karen filed her
Motion

to Alter

34.

or Amend Judgment.

"New" evidence*

R. 1369-1370.

Karen sought to alter or amend based on

"newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced prior
hereto".

She also asked the court again to set aside the 1991

custody award.

R. 1369.

The "new" evidence was that Mr. Kimball

would now swear that he believes Karen's November 4, 1991 default
letter discharged him (directly contradicting his prior conduct,
statements to the court and sworn affirmation). R. 1380-1382.
14

John tried to accomplish the further protection for
Deborah by way of a Motion to Reopen visitation,
which was denied by
the court on March 11, 1993. R. 1360-1361.
12

However, Mr. Kimball gave Mr. Darger the "new" information four
months prior to the motion. Affidavit of Darger, R. 1403.
35.

Motion denied.

On May 4, 1993 Judge Hansen entered an

order denying Karen's Motion to Alter
attack on the original Decree.
36.

Sanction•

or Amend the order denying her

R. 1494.

The court found the motion frivolous or in bad

faith, and entered a $380 fee sanction against Karen.15 R. 1494.
37.

Late Appeal*

The Appeal was filed June 2, 1993, 30 months

after the Decree and 3 months after the order denying the attack on
the Decree.16

C.

R. 1504-1505.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

1. At issue is custody of Deborah Putvin-Thompson, age 5 1/2.
Karen and John are her natural parents. She lived with both for the
first 2 years of her life, with Karen the next 4 months and with
John the last 2 and a half years — most of her life. R.
2.
polygamy.

Karen's family for generations has practiced religious
She belongs to a closed society, the "Allred Group" or

"Apostolic United Brethren."

R. 10-11, 72-73.

15

The motion, argued April 19, 1993, purported to arise from
new evidence and incompetence of Karen's prior counsel, and lack of
authority of counsel to agree to the custody and visitation. But
the evidence was available to Karen 2 years earlier, and the sworn
statement used to support the motion was directly contrary to
earlier sworn statements by the same attorney in this same case.
16

There is a serious question about appealability. There was
no Rule 54, URCP certification, and yet a Petition to Modify, filed
in December, 1992 remains outstanding in the trial court.
13

3. John, his first partner ("Donna") and Karen lived in their
union of conscience from 1982 to 1991. R. 1964-1969.

A few years

after John took Karen as a plural wife, Deborah was born on May 13,
1988. R. 10. Karen and Donna lived side by side, and by agreement
shared with John the care of and bonding with Deborah.
4.

Id.

Karen was unhappy in the relationship, in large part

because she resented the close bond Donna and Deborah developed.
1185-1188.

She felt uninvolved in Deborah's life.

R.

R., Karen

Thompson Depo. R.; trial testimony of Karen, beginning R. 1784.
5. On May 9, 1991, while John slept in the home, Karen surruptitiously absconded with Deborah around midnight, R. 10, walking a
considerable distance with Deborah, Depo., R, despite being advised
by her therapists of legal means to separate from John.
6.

Id.

Karen's father/religious leader17 picked them up on the

highway and helped conceal Deborah with members of his sect. After
a few days in Herriman, Utah Karen hid Deborah for about a month in
the Northwest and Canada. Depo. She knew that the man who harbored
them had been accused (not charged) with child sex abuse.
7.

Id.

When Karen left, she intended to permanently deprive John

and Deborah of one another's company, and to further deprive Deborah
from the society of Donna and her other significant persons,
including her brother, David McConnell Putvin.
8.

The court issued an ex parte

Temporary

Id.
Restraining

Order

and

order to show Cause, R. 15-16, ordering Karen and her family to refrain
17

Joe Thompson, Karen's father, has since been removed
from the leading councils of that religion due to numerous
accusations of sexual abuse of children over a number of years.
14

from holding Deborah outside Salt Lake County, concealing her from
John, or interfering with his custody.

R.

16. Karen was ordered

to appear May 30, 1991 to show cause why the order should not become
a preliminary injunction.
9.

Id.

Despite actual knowledge of the order, Karen failed to

appear or produce Deborah at the hearing. R. 235-238.
Evans awarded temporary custody to Karen.

R. 236.

Commissioner
Because Karen

accused John of being a criminal, his first several visits had to be
supervised by a health care professional, at John's expense.
10.

Even after Karen returned with Deborah under court order,

she admitted might possibly abscond again if things went poorly,
despite court orders to the contrary.
11.

R. 1803-1804, R. 101-114.

Arnold Gardner, a Salt Lake Attorney, was appointed as

Deborah's guardian ad litem by stipulation.
12.

R. 239-241.

Deborah was found to suffer from post traumatic stress

disorder as a result of the flight into the northwest, and her
separation anxiety in being withheld from her father. R.1958-196918

I
13.

Pobaxsh*® post traumatic stress
from beiiig takmx froatfohBis
continuing ai$d uu<li$put^d.

II
]
||

The Court ordered a custody evaluation, and the parties

stipulated to use Dr. Patricia Smith, who was appointed by the
court.

R. 239-241.

Dr. Smith met with, tested and evaluated the

18

Deborah's therapist is Karen Platis, LCSW, who specializes in treating and diagnosing small children. R. 1958-1959.
Though Ms. Platis has been Deborah's therapist for a couple of
years, for many months she had no attempted input from Karen.

15

parties exhaustively.

John suggested and took a polygraph test to

determine whether Karen's accusations were founded in fact.

The

parties stipulated that Dr. David Raskin of the University of Utah
would do the test, and the results would be admissible in evidence.
R. 335-336.

The favorable findings were incorporated into the

evaluation and the eventual stipulated Findings of Fact.
14.

Id.

Dr. Smith's evaluation strongly recommends permanent

custody to John, and expressed strong concerns about Karen's mental
state and a possible future abduction by her.

Immediately, the

parties stipulated to shift temporary custody to John, and that
change became a court order.

R. 335-336, 351-352.

referred Karen to mental health therapy.

Mr. Kimball

Since September 1991 (2

1/2 years) John has had continuous physical custody of Deborah.
15.

Despite giving up, Karen refused to sign any stipulation;

even one giving her standard, unsupervised visits. R. 2067-2068.
16. On November 4, 1991 Karen sent to Putvin, the court,
counsel and the guardian ad litem

a very disturbing letter, the

contents of which contributed to the Findings and Decree limiting
Karen's visitation.

See R. 419-470. The letter's contents caused

great alarm, when coupled with the fact she refused to sign any
stipulation, even if it gave her healthy, unsupervised visitation.
R. 2066-2069. A copy of the letter is in Appendix A.
a.

In it, she:

Relinguishes permanent custody of Deborah to Putvin;

b. States that she continues to have the same fears that
caused her to secretly take Deborah away.
c. Announces that the court system is evil, and implies
that she will seek extra-judicial relief.
16

d.
17.
1991.

In essence, announces her default and surrender.

Judge Hanson set a telephone conference for November 12,

R. 370-371.

Involved were Judge Hanson, Karen's counsel

Kimball, John's undersigned counsel and Deborah's counsel
Mr.

Id.

Kimball

orally

withdrew

his

Client's

Answer

and

Gardner.
Counterclaim,

allowing the matter to proceed by default. R. 415, 419.

Mr* Kiij&foall agre<sd ©rally to Karen*s default/
Htade necessary by her strange posture • While
refusing* to fight further through legal means,
she refused to sign any of a series of written
^stipulations offered to her, Most or all of
tftem gave her better tergjs than she ended up
w±£h ixi th* cu&t&dy ztearae* Instead, she
alluded to self help or even impending death
of John, ia Jn&r Hove«ber 4/ 1991 letter.

18.

Respective counsel, including Deborah's guardian ad

litem,

agreed for their clients that Findings, Conclusions and a Decree be
entered giving John sole permanent custody. The parties concurred
and the Court ordered that Karen's visits be supervised, due to her
emotional condition, typified by her November 4 letter.

Findings of

Fact, Conclusions and a Custody Decree were entered to that effect the
next day, November 13, 1991. R. 415-470. Appendix B.
entered

the

findings

attached

and

incorporated

evaluation and the November 4 default letter.
19.

However, as
the custody

R. 415-470.

In October, 1993 Karen married into a new polygamist

household, and moved to Lovell, Wyoming.19

The household is headed by Royston Hooper, who at last
word was an alien without right to reside in USA. Hooper depo.

17

20•

Karen's November 4 letter, besides announcing that she

will stop fighting (since "the courts today are not courts of
justice" but are controlled by money), identifies her attorney.
am going against the advice of Chase [Kimball]", she said.
letter says nothing about discharging Mr. Kimball.
In December, 1992 Findings

21.
Defendant's

Motion

to Modify

Defendant's

Motion

to Modify

Visitation,
Visitation,

The

Appendix A.

of Fact and Conclusions
R.

"I

of Law on
Order

1125-1131, and

on

R. 1132-1137, were entered.

While relaxing Karen's visitation restrictions, the new order left
intact the permanent sole custody award to John.
appealed.

It was not

John was ordered to bring Deborah from New Zealand to

Utah at his expense to visit with Karen 3 times yearly.

VII.

Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There is no legitimate basis for appeal.

The Court should

affirm Judge Hanson's ruling, with fees to John for the following
reasons, any of which is enough to affirm Judge Hanson's actions:
a.

Karen has appealed from a stipulated decree, and cannot now

complain about what she agreed to.
b.

The argument that her attorney did not really represent her

is not credible, and the record is to the contrary.
c.

Karen's attacks on the decree were untimely.

d.

Karen's entire position is barred by laches and waiver.

e.

The trial court was in a position to judge the parties'

fitness.

Judge Hanson's broad discretion cannot be overcome here.
18

f.

There is no "newly discovered evidence" for a motion to

alter or amend.
g.

The "evidence" was known to Karen all along.

Any defect is harmless, and the later modification of

visitation after trial, cures any claimed defect.
h.

The Court lacks jurisdiction, because Karen was untimely

and because there remains pending an unresolved Petition

to Modify.

i. Deborah having been in John's sole custody since September,
1991, Karen cannot meet the high burden of showing that any ping
pong custody award could be justified on remand.

VIII.
1.

ARGUMENT

Karen can't appeal a stipulated decree*

appeal from denial of a motion to alter or amend.

Settlement bars
Drury v. Lunceford,

18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 (Utah 1966); Karren v. Karren,

25 Utah 87,

69 P. 465 (Utah 1902) (after colluding to settle, one can't set
aside the decree under URCP 60(b)20
2.
timely*

The Court lacks jurisdiction,21

because the appeal was not

It should have been filed within 30 days after the date of

entry of the order appealed from.

Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P.

The

20

What Karen is really saying is that the award was an
error. Besides the fact that a stipulated result is beyond her
attack, she has also failed to marshal the evidence.
21

The Court is responsible to examine and question its own
jurisdiction, or lack thereof, at any stage of the proceedings when
it appears that jurisdiction is, in fact, lacking, silva v. Department
of Employment Security,

786 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1990).
19

appeal here challenges the November, 1991 custody Decree.

It is 2

years late, Karen's transparent attempt to extend the appeal time
with her Motion to Alter or Amend does not restore jurisdiction.
If Karen had misgivings about the Findings, conclusions and custody
Decree,

or claimed her attorney had wronged her, she should have

moved within 10 days for new or amended findings or order.
52(b).

URCP

Absent that, she could have timely appealed, but did

neither.

Her

appeal came years after the custody award, months

after the "new" evidence was known to Karen. Although it was filed
within 30 days of denial of the Motion to Alter or Amend, that motion
was filed 13 days after the order it seeks to reverse.
3.

The post-judgment motion was untimely.

Karen does not

claim she appealed within 30 days of the Decree, but that she timely
appealed under Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P. (appeal time runs from
But Rule 4(b) applies only ff[i]f

denial of post-judgment motion).

a timely motion . . . is filed . . . under Rule 59 to alter or amend
the judgment . . . ." Rule 4(b)(3), Utah R. App. P.

Here the Rule

59 motion was not legitimate, since the judgment it attacked was the
Decree, not the motion for relief.

No extension was granted.22

"An untimely motion for a new trial has no effect on the
running of the time for filing a notice of appeal."
Maiben,

652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982); Vanjora

22

The Motion

to Alter

v. Draper,

Burgers

v.

30 Utah 2d

or Amend was filed March 24, 1993.

This

was 16 months after the Decree, 4 months after the Court announced
its denial of the motion to set aside the Decree, and 13 days after
entry of the order denying relief from the Decree, since the Notice
of Appeal was untimely, and is not helped by the Motion to Alter or
Amend, this Court lacks jurisdiction.
20

364,

517

P.2d

1320

(Utah

1974).

"This

Court

cannot

take

jurisdiction over an appeal which is not timely brought before it."
Burgers,

supra, 652 P.2d at 1322. Nor can this Court.

The motion to alter or amend was really a motion to reconsider,
which is not found in the rules and does not extend the time for
appeal under Utah R. App. P. 4.
4.

There was no Rule 54 certification.

John's Petition

to

Modify has not been ruled on. Since a key issue remains in the trial
court,

the

appeal

certification.
Mackay

Co.

Aagaire,

v.

was

improper.

There

was

no

URCP

54(b)

The remedy is dismissal of Karen's appeal.

Okland

Constr.

Co.,

817 P.2d

789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990).

323

(Utah 1991);

The Petition

to Modify

Steck

A.J.
v.

may be

eligible for certification as separate, but that was not requested.
Nor was an interlocutory appeal sought.
5.

Karen is bound by her stipulation and waivers.

Changing

attorneys does not excuse her from stipulations and proceedings that
are long since final.

In Ebbert v. Ebbert,

the appellant was held

bound by his custody agreement, though he sought release from it at
trial.

744 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Utah App. 1987).

Answer he had conceded custody to his wife.

In Mr. Ebbert's
The parties so

stipulated, but after legal wrangling couldn't agree on Findings,,
conclusions

and a Decree.

Trial was held, at which time Mr. Ebbert

sought to amend his complaint to seek custody.
appropriately

did

stipulated earlier
custody.

not permit

reopening

that

The trial court
issue, since he

(though not in writing) that his wife get

Id. at 1021.

There are real similarities to Karen's
21

effort circumvent the changed circumstances standard by "appeal".
Howard

v.

Howard,

601

P. 2d

931,

934

(Utah

1979)

is

also

applicable here. There the husband signed a waiver, but he sued to
set it aside later, claiming it was induced by trickery.

The

Supreme Court noted that he had made no record of the supposed
unfairness until much later.

In light of his signed consent to

default, the court was unwilling to consider relief from the effects
of that waiver.

Id.

Like Mr. Howard, Karen has claimed she was

duped or caught unawares, and much later attacked her own agreement.
There must be a limit to such cold and hot behavior.
6.

Id.

Karen's own acts and omissions and law of the case bar her.

That is true of the original motion for relief from the
Decree,

and more true of the later Motion to Alter

custody

or Amend. Again,

Karen's litigation mode appears to be an effort to avoid the
reguirement that custody be modified only on showing a "substantial
change of material circumstances."
App. 1990); Walton v. Walton,

Karen' s

ignores

the

smith v. smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah

814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991).

fact

that

the

2

tier

change

of

circumstances standard is meant to protect children like 5 year old
Deborah against instability from ping pong custody.

Walton, 814 P.2d

at 622. She has made her bed, and now must sleep in it.
7.

Karen had every chance to protect herself. Trial was in

May, June and July 1992, and Karen testified that in January 1992
she learned of the documents approved by Mr. Kimball, and that he
had agreed to default.

See Tr. 150-160, R. 1857-1867.

She even

testified at that time that she had not considered Mr. Kimball to be
22

her counsel when the decree was entered in 1991. R. 1857.
She cannot wait still another year, take advantage of the parts
of the orders she likes, then try again what failed before, hoping
to undo it and start over in this 3 year old custody case.

Leaver

v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) (lack of diligence over time is
laches); Sandy City v. Salt

Lake Co.,

827 P. 2d 227 (Utah 1992 ). 2 3

If

permitted, the mischief such flip flops would do to custody of young
children is frightening to contemplate.
| judge Haiisoa* *mr« U&rger i*vw got to interrupt you > •
| • , I think this record needs to be clear that I don't
think anyone polled a&y fast oii&s on me by slipping
a
supervised visitation in front of me to sign. That was
signed off on by both the lm$&x& * h& a matter of
f routine, if both lawyers agree, and a brief reading of
the document does&'t iiidio&te that it's illegal, or
II immoral, or anything else, I generally sign it • * • *
md l didtartminformation regarding the Novea&er 4th
letter. • » • there were some statements in there that
mnld give my reasonable person some eoacera about not
I only her wellbeing, but the wellbeing of the childr
particularly the reference in there that she may be
I required to take off again*1f ^rial 10, 1-14-92,
R. 2214.

Karen points to incompetence or lack of authority of Kimball as
"new" evidence, but did not call him as a witness in her 1992 trial,
nor depose him. Apparently she did not even interview him about the
circumstances of the decree until that document was a year old.

The

record is before the Court and has always been available to Karen
and her counsel, both current and former.

These things were not

This is not the only situation when Mr. Kimball was her
counsel of record, but she later denied that he was representing
her. ("I frankly did not consider him my attorney" at the point
when she falsely reported two cars as having been stolen from her
by John). May 29 tr., p. 155. See also p. 159. R. 1875-1879.
23

done in the dark, and there is no trickery or surprise.
At trial in Summer 1992 Karen testified that she knew

Kimball

was involved in a court conference, that Judge Hanson issued an
order at that time changing visitation, which order ended the case
and gave John sole custody. July 8 1992, 81-83, R. 2180-2182. Yet
she has the audacity to claim that she was unaware until much later
that her answer had been withdrawn and her default entered.
As the court observed at trial:
[T]he record shows that there was an agreement that the
contesting papers on the part of Ms. Thompson would be
withdrawn, and that this matter could go by default. And
the court made a finding based upon I suppose [in part on
this] letter.
Karen and her attorney did not protest this accurate observation.
Tr. May 29, 1992, pp. 144-45. R. 1847-1849.

Judge Hanson expressed

the problem Karen created for the parties and court by trying to
change her position. And he pointed out how untenable it is to now
claim that Kimball did not or should not have allowed default.
BY THE COURT: What did you expect anyone to divine from
this other than the fact that you had decided not to
contest custody further going against the advice of your
attorney number one? Did you expect anybody to read this
letter, and get anything else besides that?
A: I didn't expect it to become controversial, and people
to assume that I was a risk — flight risk, and death risk
to Deborah . . . .
Q: Doesn't that mean that you're not going to proceed
further with the custody issue?
A: At that point, yes.
Q: So why were you surprised that your attorney had no
other alternative but to agree to your default if you
write a letter saying you're giving up? What did you want
us to do? Think you weren't telling us the truth?
A: I don't understand the legal system that well. I was
not doing too well with mv attorney.
July 8 tr., p. 91, R. 2190-2191 (emphasis added).
24

Amazingly, her

Motion to Alter or Amend, claiming Kimball was incompetent in allowing
default, or that he was somehow not her attorney at all, was not
filed until 8 months later in March, 1993. R. 1369-1428.
8.

Laches prevents what Karen seeks to do.

One who seeks

relief from a decree because of mistake, fraud or the like must
pursue her rights promptly and diligently. Karen has done quite the
opposite.

24 AmJur2d

authority there cited.

Divorce

and Separation

Sec. 488, p. 518 and

Without regard to deadlines in rules or

statutes, delay in pursuing one's rights can result in laches and
deprive the movant from having a decree set aside.

Karren v. Karren,

25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465 (Utah 1908); 24 AmJur2d Divorce

and

Separation

Sec. 487, p. 517 and authority there cited.
Laches bar relief even if a decree was based on some basic
procedural defect, such as improper service. Here, of course, Karen
claims the court failed to enter her default.

Id. As Judge Hanson

observed at the trial, "If nothing else bars this, laches does.
This has got to come to an end sooner or later. "
hearing on Motion

to Alter

Tr. p. 42,

or Amend, April 19, 1993.

Much water has gone under the bridge since the decree.

John

has had sole custody for more than half of Deborah's life, most of
that time under the custody Decree.
visits were supervised and limited.

For several months, Karen's
In 1992 John moved to New

Zealand with Donna and Deborah, where they have lived ever since.
Karen's brief gives the impression that the move was a sinister,
illegal act, but it was approved by court order.24
24

Order dated September 25, 1992, R. 967
25

Deborah goes to

school, has friends and lives her life there.

As a result of a 4

day trial in the summer 1992, Karen's visits became unsupervised
late that year. John brings Deborah to Utah to visit with Karen at
order on

his expense 3 times a year for a total of 5 weeks.
Defendant's

Motion to Modify Visitation,

R. 1132-1137.

Karen had a duty to pursue her motion to resolution, and

the

delay from her filing of a Motion to Set Aside the decree in May, 1992
(R. 707-708) to entry of the order denying the motion in March, 1993
(R. 1362) should be charged to her.

Failure

to move it along to

resolution constitutes further laches.
Since the initial decree giving John custody, the trial court
docket reveals much about what has occurred, and how far removed the

in th» 16 months between th« custody j?&cr&& &n& the
motion appealed from, there were 200 documents of

nearly 900 pages* tiled, including two multi-page/
thoughtful and comprehensive M&marandwu Uecisions

1007-1018, m o l l i s ) and & formal orders, Many

(R.

jl

depositions covering 1000s of pages were taken t and
additional 780 pages of trial &»d heariag
transcript. Subsequent findings, conclusions and

<&JI

case is from what it would have been had Karen not delayed. It is
hard to imagine a better example of laches.
9.

There is no "new evidence". The Motion to Alter or Amend is

based on Rule 59(e), URCP, which requires "Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
trial."

Id., emphasis added.

Here the claims that Mr. Kimball was

not her attorney, or made a mistake, are all old. Karen and counsel
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have had full access to Mr, Kimball for a year. And the evidence is
not "material" in any event, especially after so much delay.
The many annotations under Rule 59 appear to be universally
against the motion.
*

Show the evidence is material and competent Universal inv. Co.

v. Carpets,

*
*

To prevail Karen must (but cannot):

Inc.,

16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965);

Demonstrate that it is truly newly discovered

Id.;

Show that it could not have been found and presented at

trial, Kettner

v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (Utah 1962);

*
Demonstrate that the evidence is not incidental
cumulative of evidence already presented, universal, supra;

or

* Show that the evidence has substance, sufficient that it
would reasonably have resulted in a different outcome, creiiln
v.
Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (Utah 1952).

K&r<sxi*s failure to complytfifcbStale 59 ot to
show a basis to alt«£ or emend is fatal and
jurisdictional . lacking that, there was no
legitimete lusls 59 ojrder, a#d the appeal was
tiled
8&,,4a?ft aft ear the order, and 16 months
a£te£ tha decree she r^aXJy saeks to attack.

Here Karen has done none of those, either before or in her appeal.
Her brief virtually ignores the requirements of URCP 59, and makes
a token effort or none at all to show a need to alter or amend the
order denying her motion to set aside the original decree,
10.

It's not a time or place to challenge stipulated findings.

Karen's first point (brief p. 21-23) is to claim the Findings of Fact
are insufficient.

She phrases the argument as if she were appealing

the decree, which she did not.

Her attack on the trial court's

findings typifies the basic flaw of her case: she tries to twist
procedure to allow what is essentially an appeal of a Decree entered
27

over 2 years ago.

She could and should have raised any criticisms

then by objection to the court and, if unsuccessful, by appeal.
Instead she raises the issue on appeal from a motion to alter or
amend an order denying her earlier motion for relief from the Decree.
11.

The Findings of Fact are not defective. Karen's complaint

here is that the Findings of Fact are not sufficiently detailed to be
valid.

Of course, if that is her position she could have objected

to them or timely appealed.

Instead, her attorney signed approving

them as drafted, both as to form and content.
Karen's cited cases are inapplicable here, and worse than
unhelpful to the Court.

This is because her authorities relate to

legitimate appeals from contested decrees, while in this case the
findings and

decree are stipulated.

She relies on Hutchinson

and smith v. smith,

v.

And there was no appeal.

Hutchinson,

649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982)

726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) for the rule that trial

courts should enter specific findings supporting custody awards.
Br. 22-23.

Sadly, she cites those cases as if they are squarely on

point, ignoring the authority distinguishing them (see below).25

She

compounds the misinformation by quoting from Martinez v. Martinez,

728

P. 2d 994 (Utah 1986), Br. 23, and stating, "This is exactly the
instant case."

25

Id.

It certainly is not.26

To appeal a pretrial loss on the merits may violate Rule

33, Utah R. App. P.

Hunt v. Hurst,

26

785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990).

Karen's Martinez itself (Br. p. 23) belies the statement that
this "is exactly this case." It states that the findings must be
more complete "when the custody award is challenged and an abuse of
discretion is urged on appeal." Martinez, 728 P.2d at 994 (emphasis
added). Here the award was not appealed nor challenged timely.
28

This Court has already compared and contrasted smith and Martinez
to a case much more similar to this one.
The smith and Martinez cases are distinguishable from the
instant case. In smith and Martinez, custody was hotly
contested and, therefore, detailed findings were required
for appropriate review on appeal. In the instant case,
custody was not at issue. . . . [T]he parties agreed
custody should be awarded to defendant.
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987).

That distinction is

even more pronounced here. Not only was custody not at issue when
the findings were entered

(having been agreed on); they were

stipulated to and not appealed. Then the resulting Decree was lived
by for a considerable period before Karen attacked them.
We hold that when custody is not an issue, the specific
findings required when custody is contested are not
necessary.
To hold otherwise would burden the trial
courts to prepare full, specific, detailed findings in
every default divorce. We find the court's findings to be
sufficient to support the custody decision.
Ebbert, 744 P.2d at 1021-22.21

The findings in Ebbert which were

deemed adequate contain language nearly identical to those here:
"The Defendant is a good mother and a fit and proper person to have
the care, custody and control of said two children."

Id. at 1021.28

It is impossible to place too much emphasis on Karen's express
approval of the findings through her attorney.
27

Karen didn't reveal that Ebbert controls this case on the
issue of the detail required for stipulated findings. Frivolous
appeals are discussed below. Rule 3.3(a)(3), Rules of Proff'l.
Conduct, UCJA (candor requires that the court be informed of
contrary applicable legal authority).
28

Finding 2:"Putvin is a fit and proper parent to whom
permanent custody and control of Deborah should be awarded." R.
420. # 3: "The evidence demonstrates that Thompson may flee with
Deborah, and should be required to submit to mental health
treatment."
29

Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an
issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
URCP 52(c).

This is not a divorce case, so the exclusion from Rule

52(c) is inapplicable.

Karen agreed to default, subsection (1),

consented in writing, which writing filed in the cause, subsection
(2), and consented in open court through counsel.

Id. While that

consent is not reflected in the brief minute entry, R. 414, it was
memorialized by her attorney signing the findings themselves:
Respective counsel informed the Court of [Karen's] stated
and written desire to withdraw her answer and proceed with
this case by default.
[Mr. Kimball], on behalf of
[Karen], orally withdrew the Answer and Counterclaim.
Findings,
12.

R. 419 (Appendix C); also, Decree, R. 415, Appendix B.
There were

extensive

findings.

They would be in

compliance even if the matter had been contested and appealed.

The

body of the findings themselves includes not only the fact that
Putvin is a "fit and proper parent to whom permanent custody and
control of Deborah should be awarded" (Findings,
indicated by Karen's brief.

par. 2, R. 420), as

The court also found, "[E]vidence

demonstrates that Thompson may flee with Deborah, and should be
required to submit to mental health treatment."

Id. at par. 3.

Further, the trial court's findings are not limited to those
contained within the body of the document.

Rather, substantial

evidence was incorporated by reference into the Findings of Fact.
The parties, through counsel, stipulated that the Court
consider the court-ordered custody evaluation by Patricia
Smith, Phd. and Thompson's November 4, 1991 letter to
Putvin (both attached hereto) as evidence in the case.
30

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

failed

to acknowledge

those

of

Law,

p. 1-2, R.

attachments

419-420.

in her

brief.

Karen

The

evaluation is found at R. 413-466, and Karen's letter is R. 467-470.
Incorporating those documents by reference and annexing them to the
Findings

was not required here, where custody was not at issue.

Ebbert v. Ebbert,

744 P. 2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1987).

However, it

was done out of an abundance of caution.
As supplemented by the attachments, the Findings include the
following as it relates to John's fitness for custody29:
* John has above average expressive skills and frustration
tolerance and is a motivated, efficient worker. R. 434.
* John's intelligence is in the 95th %, with superior memory,
mental control, reasoning, visual reproduction, motor speed and
ability to differentiate essential and inessential detail. Id. In
other areas, such as spatial relationships, he is High Average. Id.
* John was guarded, defensive, and presenting himself in best
light. He tends to misinterpret others' motives. He is sensitive,
romantic, compassionate and artistic, in contrast with Karen's claim
that he is aggressive and controlling. R. 435.
* John was independent and extroverted, but also impulsive and
self righteous. Id. He likes to help others, but believes his
intentions are misunderstood. Id. He had no depression, thought
disturbance or intentional antisocial practices. R. 437.
* John had difficulty empathizing with Karen. R. 436. The
religious plural marriage was uncomfortable for John, and he
eventually rejected the polygamist lifestyle. R. 436.
* John's wife Donna lived with John and little Deborah during
the marriage and helped raise her. R. 437. John shows caring
dedication for family, exposing Deborah to good education, music,
language and other opportunities. Id.
As to Karen's fitness for custody, she found:

Dr. Smith's unusually comprehensive Custody Evaluation also
lists many pages of evidence which she considered in concluding
Putvin should have sole custody. R. 413-430; 438-442.
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* Karen has had much mental health treatment, R. 434-435, 449,
but now showed no thought disturbance. R. 441. She was depressed
at puberty and while with John. At times she felt suicidal, and
wrote a suicide note, got a gun but decided not to use it. R. 441.
* She is considerate and polite. R. 438. She is a member of
an LDS fundamentalist group which espouses polygamy.30 R. 440-441.
She had many jobs, some ending in discharge. R. 439.
* Karen fled with Deborah, then age 3, in May, 1991, and spent
3 weeks with her in Washington.
She said she felt John would
blackmail her to prove her to be an unfit mother. R. 412. She
feared John would flee with Deborah. R. 441. She would prefer to
have custody, limiting John to supervised visitation. Id.
* Karen resented the close bond between Deborah and Johnfs
wife Donna. R. 441. She felt she was a "breeding cow" for John and
Donna, who had no natural children together. R. 412.
* In taking tests, Karen showed good attention, perseverance
and ability to understand directions. Id. She was cooperative,
appropriate, socially engaging and emotionally responsive. She has
superior immediate auditory memory and motor skills. R. 412.
* Her verbal and intelligence skills are High Average. R.
413. Despite a college education, she is weak in educational and
cultural experiences.
Overall she has average to high average
intelligence, but has been employed beneath her potential. Id.
*
Karen is defensive, unassertive, lacks self esteem and
social awareness. R. 413. She was defensive in 1987 therapy, minimizing problems.
She is socially inexperienced and feels
inadequate. She felt John imprisoned her and stole Deborah. Id.
She admits to no fault in failure of her relation with John. Id.
* Her MMPI may have been wrong. She answered "false" to so
many questions that her profile was "subclinical". R. 413. She has
a strong need for affection and attention, which makes her afraid to
share her true feelings and beliefs. R. 414.
* Karen misperceives that both John and his wife Donna have
emotionally hurt the child Deborah. R. 414.
* She is lonely, unfulfilled, bitter and resentful. R. 415.
Taking Deborah shows poor problem solving. She fulfilled her own
needs, but was unable to see that she caused Deborah stress and
confusion by taking her from her home and loved ones. She is self
righteous and immature about taking Deborah from John. R. 418.
30

On October 24, 1992, Karen remarried into a polygamist
family, with which she now lives in Wyoming.
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* She seeks custody due to guilt and anger toward John for not
promoting a normal mother-child bond, R. 415. She needs Deborah to
see her as a loving mother whom John prohibited from caring for her.
R. 415. She feels it was fine to take her to herself to make up for
lost time. Id. She thrives on time with Deborah. R. 416.
* To Karen men are "persuasive, cunning, charming, devious and
dishonest." R. 415. She believes fJohn wants custody as a way to
control Karen, and may resent John s bond with Deborah. Id.
*
Karen shows poor judgment, use of community and family
resources, unrealistic fantasies and problems holding a job. R.
416. She believes her happiness is based on custody, but "has not
demonstrated the necessary skills for full time primary care." Id.
* Deborah bonded with John, and double bonded with Karen and
her surrogate mother Donna. R. 463. John is involved in Deborah's
development, support, education and cultural growth. Id. Karen's
relationship with Deborah is more dependent, and Deborah shows
regressive, immature, oppositional behaviors with Karen. R. 464.
* Deborah is bright, advanced, and needs the education and
culture John gives. R. 464. His finances are superior to Karen's,
who has sporadic employment, with jobs below her education level.
R. 463-464. Her lifestyle is less stable than John's. R. 464.
There were also findings concerning John's wife Donna, R. 451453, and concerning Deborah herself, R. 455-462.
* Karen's parenting skills are more limited than John's and
his wife Donna's. R. 465. It is in Deborah's interest to continue
in her environment with John and Donna, both of whom have been
caretakers, with a non-custodial relationship with Karen. R. 465.
* If Karen received custody, Deborah may be raised in a plural
marriage relationship. Karen had poorly handled the relationship
with John and Donna. R. 465. He will likely alienate Deborah from
polygamy. Karen is more likely to alienate Deborah from John. Id.
The parties stipulated that Dr. Smith's findings are evidence
incorporated into the Findings,
letter to John.

along with Karen's November 4, 1991

That letter is telling reading.

The highlights

include (with all emphases added):
* "I will no longer fight with you to try and win custody.
There is no reason to continue this battle in the courts. . . . I
pray that the courts and you will be fair with my visitation and
legal rights." R. 467. "I do not want to fight anymore because I
33

do not want Deborah being hurt any more. I could not stand before
God, with my head held high, knowing that I stopped taking steps to
protect and save my daughter." R. 470.
* "Those fears that I have of you, the fears that made me run
from you in May, are still just as real today as they were back
then*" Id. "I also know that the courts today are not courts of
justice, but they are controlled by those who have money." R. 468.
* "I am not giving up and neither is my family, but we cannot
fight the devil on his own ground." Id. "I know that sometime,
somewhere I will have my Deborah* You cannot travel down the same
course you are on, doing what you do to people and expect to
continue to survive." R. 469.
* "I now put Deborah into God's hands (not yours) and pray
that the time will be short when I will be able to be a complete
mother to her." R. 470.
The court, John, his counsel and Deborah's guardian ad

litem

were concerned by the letter, which concern led to visits that were
temporarily supervised for Deborah's protection.

They, along with

Karen's own attorney, agreed on Findings that included the custody
evaluation, John's polygraph and Karen's letter, making them very
comprehensive.

For Karen's

brief

to highlight

the

supposed

inadequate findings as a first argument is appalling and meritless.
13.

The Court entered Karen's default*

Respective counsel informed the Court of . . . Thompson's
stated and written desire to withdraw her answer and
proceed with this case by way of a default matter. Chase
Kimball, Esq., on behalf of Thompson, then withdrew the
Answer and Counterclaim on file in this case.
The
parties, through counsel (including the guardian ad
litem), stipulated that the Court should consider the
court-ordered custody evaluation by Patricia Smith, Phd.
and Thompson's November 4, 1991 letter to Putvin .
as evidence in the case.
Decree, p. 1-2; Findings, p. 1-2, executed by all counsel (emphasis
added).

Karen's agreement makes irrelevant the technical niceties

about which she now complains.

And the parties stipulated that
34

Karen's November letter, which itself constitutes a default, be
attached to the Findings of Fact, and used as a basis for the custody
decree.

Karen's authorities are not on point.

Each relates to a

default

judgment and timely motion to set aside which were

appealed, or where default was a sanction in a contested matter.
Karen is concerned that the clerk did not enter a default.
While URCP 55(b)(1) allows a default to be entered by the clerk,
subsection (1) of the same rule provides for its entry by the court
in "all other cases." URCP 55(b)(2).

As Judge Hanson stated,

[W]hen people default, or say they aren't going to
participate, like Ms. Thompson did in that letter, then
I kind of take them at their word. And say if you don't
want to be involved in it, the other side gets what they
want. That's kind of what defaults are all about.
Transcript of trial, July 14, 1992, p. 10-11, R 2214-2215.

As

Judge Hanson recognized, Karen's letter itself is a default, or
became one when it was so stipulated by Mr. Kimball.31 Karen's

The long and the short ti& tftat] at the pretrial coat sreacfc ia Hovexaber * * «, * the record
^Jiows that there was am agreement that the
contesting
papers on the part -of M&* Thompson
would be wit3j8lj?«wo, and that this matter would
go by default. &ttd the ctmxt made a finding
based • - • in part oii that letter • &• 184?«

argument that no default was entered, relying on p & B Land, inc. v.
Klungervik,

751 P.2d 274 (Utah App. 1988), can be charitably called

31

Karen expects the trial court to ignore her stipulation
through counsel. This idea seems akin to a plain error doctrine,
but such has not been argued and certainly does not apply.
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misplaced and meaningless.32

The Klungervik defendants were not in

default, had filed an answer (which was not withdrawn) and remained
"full-fledged combatants".

751 P.2d at 276.

That case merely

points out that a default judgment should not be entered "where
there is no default in law or in fact".
Klungervik

Id., 751 P.2d at 277. In

neither side asked the court to strike the answer or

enter default, but it was. Here all 3 sides asked for that.
Here Karen withdrew all opposition.

She did so in writing and

directly, by sending her letter to the court, as well as through
counsel, and actually stipulated to the relief granted.
calls Klungervik

(supra) "squarely on point".

Nonsense.

Karen
Besides

the differences pointed out, that court disregarded defendants
answer against his will, because his response to a summary judgment
motion was deficient; there was no agreement as there is here.
14.
action*

The decree and findings accurately reflect the court's
Karen cites Darrington v. Wade, stating that a court can

always correct its error. 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), cited at
br. p. 26. She then makes a leap of logic, assuming that since the
minute entry was less detailed than the Findings, error was made.
This is not evidence of error.

Not only is the minute entry

consistent with the Findings and Decree, but Karen, through
counsel, approved the content of both by signature.
32

Actually

It is disturbing that Karen calls Klungervik
"squarely on
point". Such statements should be reserved for cases with similar
facts and procedure. Similarly, after observing that in Klungervik
the judge passed over part of the default process "by striking
defendants answer" and proceeding to default, she says, "This is
precisely what the court did in this case". Br. p. 24. Not true.
Judge Hanson did not strike anything, much less over objection.
36

Darrington stresses the importance of timely attacking a judgment by
a prompt URCP 60(b) motion or its equivalent, which Karen did not
do.

Id, 812 P. 2d at 457. Without citing any applicable authority,

she asks the Court to impose a new, burdensome but useless duty on
the judge and clerk.

She wants the Court to require minute entries

to be as detailed as findings and decrees.
15.

There is no violation of Rule 4-504, UCJA. That rule

requires that a stipulation be written or on the record.
done here.
16.

That was

If there had been a defect, it was fully waived.

The parties did stipulate*

It is disturbing that Karen

could allege (through counsel) that the parties did not stipulate,
when she and her counsel both know otherwise.

Evidence of the

stipulation includes, but is not limited to, the following:
a.
The minute entry, which memorializes that the relief
granted was upon "AGREEMENT OF COUNSEL" (capitols in original);
b.
The signature of both Karen's counsel (Kimball) and
Deborah's (Gardner) on the Findings, indicating "approved" (not "as
to form", as would be used in the event a signataries' client
disagreed with the terms), see Findings, page 4, Appendix B;
c. The signature of Karen's and Deborah's counsel on the
Decree, approving it as to substance. See Decree, page 4;
d. The Court's execution of the Findings and Decree, relying
on approval by all counsel, his the judge's own recollection and/or
notes of the phone conference and the clerk's minute entry;
e.

The recall and file notes of counsel33; and

f. The parties' conduct, which has been wholly consistent
with the mutual understanding reflected in the Decree.
How then can Karen (through her counsel) claim with a straight
face that the parties did not stipulate, and that their agreement
33

S e e , e . g . Affidavit

of Arnold Gardner,
37

A p p e n d i x C.

was not written?

"Equity is not available to reinstate rights

and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has
come to regret the bargain made."
527, quoting Land v. Land,

Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526,

605 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1980).

It is not necessary that a stipulation be read word for word
into the record.

The important thing is that the record reflect

its existence. An agreement of the parties will not be enforced by
the Court "unless it is evidenced by a writing subscribed by the
party against whom it is alleged or made, and filed by the clerk or
entered upon the minutes of the court."

stipulations

73 Am.Jur2d

Sec. 2 (1974) (footnote omitted, emphasis added); quoted with
approval in Barker

17.

v. Brown,

744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987).

The parties1 agreement cures any claimed defect.

For

example, where an instrument is stipulated to as a legitimate
judgment, the assent cures the formal requirements of a judgment.
73 AmJur2d stipulations

Sec. 16, p. 554 and authority there cited.

Having agreed to it, a party cannot later attack its validity.
See, McClelland

v. Leahy,

75 Colo. 542, 227 P. 549

Id.

(1908).

One is not generally released from her own stipulation.35
is

especially

inappropriate

It

to allow a party to withdraw a

stipulation the parties have acted on, and where it is impossible
to return the parties to their status

quo ante.

73 AmJur2d

34

The strong emotion of a custody dispute is no excuse for
an inaccurate procedural history. Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.
35

Karen never repudiated her letter, or asked to be released
from her attorney's agreements. Rather, she attacks the Decree, as
if the judge should paternalistically ignore her express desire to
surrender custody, and counsel having signed the documents.
38

stipulations

Sec. 12, p. 547 and authority there cited.

Here 5 year

old Deborah has been in Johnfs sole custody pursuant to the Decree
for some two and a half years.

Father and daughter have moved to

New Zealand, and the Court requires that he bring her to Salt Lake
thrice yearly for extended visitation with Karen.
So after taking advantage of portions of the Decree which favor
her for 26 months, Karen wishes rid herself of the whole thing.

A

party will not be allowed to take advantage of the agreed terms she
likes, and then withdraw the portions she does not.
page 548; 73 AmJur2d stipulations
and Separation

See, Id. at

Sec. 13, p. 549; 24 AmJur2d Divorce

Sec. 488, p. 518 and authority there cited.

Courts do not relieve one from a stipulation if the other
party will be substantially prejudiced.

73 AmJur2d stipulations

Sec.

13, p. 548 and authority cited. This Decree has been in effect for
over 2 years. The evidence present then may not be available for
retrial.

And the custody evaluation may be stale.

A stipulation settling a case is more durable and harder to
attack than stipulations as to issues or procedure, and the party
attacking it has a high burden of persuasion.
18.

Mr. Kimball did represent Karen.

Id.

As demonstrated by the

facts and procedure above, the record shows it, and Mr. Kimball's
affidavit two years ago says so.36

The Court and all counsel and

parties have been consistently told the opposite.

If the Court had to choose to believe Mr. Kimball when he
swears he was Karen's counsel at the relevant time and the new one
that says he thinks he was not, it is worthwhile to consider that
the statement that he was her attorney was closer to the event.
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Even if Mr. Kimball had been ostensibly fired, the court and
respective counsel had no choice but to recognize him.
When an attorney is changed . . . written notice of the
change and of the substitution of a new attorney or of
the appearance of the party in person must be given to
the adverse party; until then he must recognize the
former attorney.
Section 78-51-35, Utah Code (1917) (emphasis added).
Kimball's affidavit is inconsistent with the record.

Besides

the obvious inaccuracy of claiming he was not Karen's attorney, the
details show a lack of credibility.

For example, he claims that

"several days later" he was asked by John to sign approving the
Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law and Custody

Decree.

In fact, the

record shows they were signed later that very same day, by him and
the guardian, and the next day by Judge Hanson.

Through counsel

Karen has propounded that error throughout her papers.
It is maddening to go through the exercise of showing all the
acts Mr. Kimball did for Karen, but she has raised his nonrepresentation as a serious appeal issue. Having so done, its bad faith
nature and lack of merit cannot be assumed to be obvious to this
Court.

The following are included in the acts of Mr. Kimball which

clearly belie the new claim that he did not represent his client:
a. Kimball appeared in this case from the outset, May, 1991.
R. 94. He appeared in writing and at hearing before Karen returned
from hiding. The record attests abundantly that his representation
continued until he withdrew April 30, 1992, R. 642-643, some 5
months after his stipulation to default and approval of Decree.
b. In Karen's November 4 letter (Appendix A) announcing her
default ("the courts today are not courts of justice" but
controlled by money) she acknowledges who her attorney is: "I am
going against the advice of Chase [Kimball]" in giving up, she
said. The letter says nothing about discharging Mr. Kimball.
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c. On November 19, 1991 (after the Decree was entered), Mr.
Kimball wrote to Judge Hanson as Karenfs attorney.
R. 471-476.
d. Kimball continued very active representation in the case,
including the following additional documents he filed for Karen:
* A January 27 Notice of Hearing and separate Notice
Change.
R. 484, 485. January 30, 1992 Motion for Expedited
Notice of Hearing.
R. 489-490.
e.
to Strike

of
Address
Hearing -

January 31, 1992 Kimball filed Memorandum Supporting
and for Sanctions
- Response to Motion for Proof of Authority,

Motion
with

related motion and affidavit. Appendix D; R. 499-503. He stated:
[A]ttached hereto is the affidavit of Chase Kimball
stating his representation of the defendants has
continued from the time he answered the original
complaint. • • • [T]his author will produce his client,
Karen Thompson, at a hearing to be held this coming
Monday, and the Court may satisfy itself that she is
represented by the author at that time.
Id., Appendix D, R. 501-502 (emphasis added). The papers express
alarm that John doubted that Kimball has always been Karen's
counsel. It calls any doubt "patently absurd", and seeks sanctions
against the undersigned for suggesting uncertainty, since
continuous representation is "clear to the dullest intellect." Id.
f. On February 3, 1993, 2 1/2 months after he and Karen now
say in hindsight that he might have been discharged, Mr. Kimball
appeared in Judge Hanson's court, seeking an expedited hearing and
(again) sanctions against the undersigned attorney for John. 2-392 Min. Entry, R. 505. Importantly, the record shows that Karen
appeared at this hearing with her attorney, Mr. Kimball. Id.
g. Further representation• February 10 he filed a motion for
unsupervised visits. R. 515. February 13 he asked for hearing,
filing a Memorandum Opposing Motion

to Relieve

Guardian

ad litem.

520. March 23, 1992 he objected to a proposed order.

R. 516-

R. 543-544.

h. March 23 he filed Response to Motion to Require
Psychological
Evaluation.
R. 548-549.
March 30, 1992 he filed her .Request for
Ruling
and Proffer
of Credentials.
R. 577-592.
April 14, 1992 he

approved one of several orders. R. 807. April 27 he again moved,
ex parte, for sanctions against John and his attorney (for "witness
tampering"), R. 609-631, with a long, fiery memorandum. Id.
i. April 30, 1992 Kimball withdrew for the only time. R.
642-643. Attached to the withdrawal is a statement that then (so
not before then), Karen retrieved from him her file. R. 643.
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j. On the same date he wrote for Karen a letter to Dr. Robert
Howell, appointed to psychologically evaluate Karen. R. 644. The
next day, May 1, 1992, John filed his Notice

counsel.

to Appear

or Appoint

New

R. 645. Karen lacked counsel of record for only a week.

According to Karen's own testimony, in April 1992 she was
"ready to fire" Kimball. Tr. of May 29, 1992 trial testimony, p.
155-156, R. 1857-1858• How can she now in good faith base a motion
and now an appeal on the claim Kimball had already been fired and
did not represent her back in November of the prior year?
19.

If her attorney acted unwisely, Karen remains bound.

is very rare that incompetence of civil counsel is not
to the Client.

Jennings

v.

Stoker,

It

attributed

652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah

1982).

Besides showing exceptional circumstances, Karen would have to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict.
914.

Id. at

She repeatedly testified that giving up was her actual intent

when the November Decree was entered.

Her second thoughts were not

raised until 6 months later. How could she claim the result would
have been different if Mr. Kimball had not withdrawn her answer?
20.

The motion to set aside the Decree was untimely as well*

The only argument Karen has for appealing now rather than in 1991
when the Decree was entered is her Rule 60(b) URCP motion to set
aside

the

judgment.

R.

707-708,

658-704

and

719-731.

Interestingly, Rule 60(b) is hardly mentioned in Karen's brief.
A party wanting Rule 60(b) relief faces 2 layers of time
restrictions.

The motion must be brought "within a reasonable

time" and, where applicable, "not more than 3 months" after the
order.

URCP 60(b).

Karen filed her 60(b) motion May 26, 1992, 6
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months after the Decree, and failed to get an order on the motion
until March 11, 1993.

She is outside the 3 month limit, so she

must show that her motion was brought within a "reasonable time".
21.

The motion is beyond a "reasonable time". A reasonable

time is a real limit on relief from domestic decrees for "other
reason[s] justifying relief".
494 P.2d 283 (1972)

McGavin v. McGavln, 27 Utah 2d 200,

{motion for paternity retest and relief from

decree not within 'reasonable time1 was too late to consider}.
A "reasonable time" is determined according to the facts in
each case, "considering such factors as the interest in finality,
the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to
learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the
parties."

Maertz

v. Maertz

827 P.2d 259 (Utah App. 1992).

Maertz

was

an adoption case, which observed that the needs of finality in
cases involving children create a special need for finality.
22.

Karen is estopped from assailing the Decree.

Id.
This

prevents her living with the Decree awhile, then undo it at whim.
Karren

v.

Karren,

25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465 (Utah 1908) (attack divorce

decree); 24 AmJur2d Divorce

23.

and Separation

Sec. 488, p. 518.

Deference is due the trial judge.

Judge Hanson had

a

unique view of all the factors, to see the parties, their support
persons and professionals testify, and to sift through the hundreds
of file papers.

He deserves deference to protect against Karen's

attacks, thinly disguised as legal arguments.
Judge Hanson heard the better part of 4 days of evidence.

He

was present and expressed on the record that he has actual recall
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as to the settlement conference when the matter was settled.

He

dealt directly with Mr. Kimball and Karen, who now claim the former
ceased representing the latter months before he withdrew.
able

to

observe

first hand

whether

there was

He was

some drastic

incompetence as currently claimed by Karen.
24.

The attorney fee sanction was appropriate.

Karen moved

to alter or amend based on "newly discovered evidence", knowing the
evidence was not new.

Earlier in this same case, Kimball swore

under oath to the opposite effect.

Likewise, such a sanction is

appropriate for this appeal of the same nonissues.
by the Decree.

Karen is bound

Her efforts to escape having to show a substantial

change of material circumstances are unavailing.
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which
had jurisdiction . . . binds all parties who have been
served . . . . As to these parties the custody decree is
conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and
as to the custody determination made unless and until
that determination is modified pursuant to law . . . .
Section 78-45C-12, Utah Code (1980).

See also, Section 30-3-7(1),

Utah Code (1992) (decree of divorce absolute upon entry).
25.

Sanctions should be imposed on appeal*

The many examples

of irrelevant, frivolous and even misleading37 assertions are set
forth above and will not be set out in detail here.

It's an appeal

of a 1991 decree the court is dealing with, and neither it nor John
should have to do so. Unless Karen can show a substantial change
of material circumstances justifying a modification, John should be

37

The effort to minimize the fact that Karen has perpetuated this sworn inconsistency on which Karen's whole effort is
based, calling it "misperception in retrospect", is unhelpful.
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finally left alone to raise and nurture Deborah, who suffers from
post traumatic stress, so long as he continues as in the past to
comply strictly with the court's visitation orders.
Where an appeal is brought from an action that was properly
determined by the trial court to be in bad faith, the appeals court
must necessarily find the appeal to be frivolous under Rule 33,
Utah R. App. P.

(Utah App. 1991).

Utah Dept.

of Soc'l.

Services

v. Adams,

806 P. 2d 1193

This is our case. Under that rule, double costs

and/or attorney fees should be assessed.

What Karen has filed and

done is not grounded in fact or warranted by law.
Where, as here, a domestic appeal is taken without basis for
the

arguments

presented,

or

where

the

law

or

facts

mischaracterized, damages under Rule 33 may be called for.

are
See,

Eames v. Eames, 735 P. 2d 395 (Utah 1987).

IX.

CONCLUSION & RELIEF SOUGHT

Karen has no basis for relief from her voluntary Decree.
really

seeks to modify it without the changed

required by 6-404, UCJA.
change the

264 (1962).

circumstances

Since Karen failed to appeal, she can

Decree only through

Changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

She

Anderson

a petition to modify, showing

v. Anderson,

12 U t a h 2 d . 3 6 , 368 P . 2d

Yet she argues as if on appeal.

Karen fails to mention what an attack on a 26 month old
custody award could do to her 5 year old daughter who, thanks to
her ill-advised attempt to cut her off permanently from her father
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2 years ago, is already in therapy for separation anxiety.
Karenfs effort seems at best based on revisionist history; a
retrospective

interpretation

of

events

from

her

own

narrow

perspective, without due regard to the facts. Karen's poison pen
brief does little to remedy her lack of substance and merit. The
current Kimball affidavit states that he was not Karen's attorney
on November 12th.

But on January 31, 1992 he told the Court that

he never stopped being Karen's attorney. That fact was available
and a matter of public record when Karen filed her current motion.
The appeal was untimely, depriving the Court of jurisdiction.
There is, therefore, no choice but to dismiss it, with costs to
John.

Further, John moves for an award of double costs and

attorney fees on appeal.

Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.38

Since the

appeal lacks jurisdiction, and is based on a motion that the trial
judge already found to be frivolous, it should be characterized the
same here.

A frivolous appeal for Rule 33 purposes is one which

has no reasonable basis in law or fact.
306 (Utah App. 1987).

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d

Bad faith is not required.

Id.

John requests dismissal of the appeal and affirmance of Judge
Hanson's various rulings Karen has appealed from, with double costs
and attorney fees on appeal.
Respectfully submitted the 18th day of January, 1994.

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff
38

The fee amount may be imposed by this Court, or determined
upon submission of an attorney fee affidavit with the trial court.
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X.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Mitchell R. Barker
349 South 200 East, # 170
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Telephone 364-5145
Bar Number 4530

I Mitchell Barker, certify that on this ^ t h day of January,
1994 I served two copies of the attached Appellee's Response Brief
upon Daniel Darger, Esq., counsel for the appellant in this matter,
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid, to the following address:

Daniel Darger, Esq.,
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX A
Karen Thompson letter

dated

Nov. 4,

1991

November *•• iVVl
John f
1 have been doing some serious soul searching*
especially since the events of the last few days* about what
the future truly holds for Deborah and me. After considering
these last ultimate demands you have made on met
particularly using blackmail, I have prayerfully and
carefully come to the decisions that in order to save my
daughter f as well as my own integrity, 1 know I have no
choice but to do the following.
Y O U know that you have dragged me through the dirt and
the mire all through our so-called marriage* and through
your vengeance 1 am once again being imprisoned by your
unrelenting desire to control me* which is quickly choking
my new-found life right out of me. Not only have you done
everything you can* using every means in your hands to
destroy me, but have also sought to destroy my loved ones
and most particularly using such means to destroy Deborah.
Consequently, 1 have come to the decision I am forced
to make in order to maintain my own peace of mind and
integrity, as well as Deborah's welfare. 1 will no longer
fight with you to try and win custody. There is no reason to
continue this battle in the courts, and 1 pray that you will
cease this legal nightmare. 1 pray that the courts and you
will be fair with mv visitation and legal rights.
1 have become so frustrated with the "legal svstem".
Ihose fears that 1 have of vou, the fears that made me run
from you in May, are still just as real today as they were
back then. If 1 accept your offer 1 am putting myself in the
exact same position that I was in before. Controlling my
everv action bv using Deborah as the bait, "(he only
difference now is that it is put in writing. Ana yet nobody
seems the least bit concerned about my fears. How can J even
expect a fair fight when everyone is oniy concerned tor vour
r lghts.
John, vou have an unlimited supply of monev at your
disposal, ana you know 1 have no more monev and neither does
my family. 1 know that if we went before a iudge and 1 were
to win custody, that your wrath and destruction would
increase ten-fold. So 1 will no longer fight you nor will 1
allow you to destroy my daughter in order to destroy me. Her
vulnerable mind is being poisoned with so much hate towards
me and my family, that it is starting to affect her all the
time. It iust kills me to hear mv three-year-old child make
hate statements aoout her favorite "significant others",
such as James, Jarea, both of her grandparents, and all of
her aunts and uncles that she has grown to love. She nas
even made hate statements about people that she has not seen
r r

* ' '•

for weeks! 1 do not understand how you can say that you love
Deborah and then turn her against those that she loves. At
least my family has enough human decency to use a different
name when speaking about you when she is around, such as
"Putvin"- a name that she is not familiar with.
Vou know and I know that any just judge or attorney
would never consent to the demands that you have made upon
me, making me literally and totally your slave. I also know
that the courts today are not courts of justice, but they
are controlled by those who have the money. And you know who
has the money. It is sickening to realize that Dr. Smith and
the courts can take a baby away from her rightful and
perfectly fit mother and then give her to her father who is
a known criminal, all on the basis that you make more money
than me. If we were to throw out the money issue, you would
not stand a chance. And 1 will warn you, Dr. Smith, Mitch
and everyone else, if you even try and make an issue out of
my religous beliefs, the ACLU will take up the battle with
me. The only reason why you have custody now is because of
your illegal money. John, you will one day find that what
you have bought with money through the courts on earth will
NUT ultimately be upheld in the courts in heaven. What you
buy will never be yours. Vou have that yet to face.
I am going against the advice of Chase in making my
decision not to sign your demands, and I know he will
strongly disagree with me. He feels that I should sign and
then wait for you to be arrested, but you are too smooth and
untrustworthy for me to trust. And you have put too much
fear into the hearts of the people that are eyewitnesses to
vour crimes, that nobody dares come forward with the truth.
And without their testimony you will probably never be
arrested.
I feel I am in the same situation as the mother who
stood before Solomon in the bible, only this time justice
has not been served. 1 would much rather die a thousand
deaths than watch my child's mind, soul and general wellbeing be slowly butchered by you and this custody hell, Y O U
are tearing her apart and dividing her, making a scapegoat
out ot her mother in order to qet your way and be able to
boast of your own strength. I feel that the only humane
thing I can do in order to stop this atrocity is to let you
have your way. I have no choice but let go and let God be
your ludae.
I am not giving up and neither is my family, but we
cannot fight the devil on his own ground. I know that you
will tell Deborah that her mother gave her up, but I will
have a written record of all that has happened and have
witnesses that know the true facts in this matter, Y O U have
destroyed any love or respect that I could have had for you.
o r •! *

Not only is Deborah the only true love of my life, she
is my best friend- It hurts so much to let go. But I do not
feel that I have lost, nor that you have won. I know that
sometime, somewhere I will have my Deborah. Vou cannot
travel down the same course you are on, doing what you do to
people and expect to continue to survive. One of these days
you will fallt destroying yourself.
All I have ever wanted was to be loved and to give
love. 1 have this with Deborah but with your poison 1 see it
slipping away. 1 love Deborah with all of my heart and 1
will never stop loving her.
1 am sure you will use your
silver tongue to convince her otherwise but the guiet
language of love will always be heard over your shouting
lies. I want to experience true love, honesty, kindness,
caring, generosity, trust and partnership with a husband. I
want to have more children. There is no way I can have this
if you are still controlling my life in what I do and where
I go. I want freedom to control my own destiny. 1 cannot
have a normal relationship with anyone including Deborah
under your conditions and demands. What good am I to Deborah
if 1 can't even save myself; and if I accept your "offer"
she will grow up having no respect for me. I cannot live
with that.
1 cannot live in a house that I feel is being bugged or
accept the intimidation of being followed, watched, and
wondering if you have entered the house in my absence. 1 ask
you now John, to show some human decency and respect. 1
intend to leave your house in Copperton, leave your car and
possessions as soon as possible. I know I am bound by
contract to live there, and that you can legally sue me for
back rent. I will ask that you not enforce the contract, but
if you must then so be it. I want my name taken off all
contracts, insurance bonds, property, mortgages, etc. 1 hope
that you will have the decency to be satisfied that you have
full custody, and stop the threats against my friends and
ramily. And that you will keep your promise that you have
made to Owen and Lamoine.
1 will not turn my back on my friends, Jerry Haynor was
one of the only few people that 1 could turn to in my hours
OT desperation. The only thing Jerry wanted to do was to
help me, and he has sacrificed everything because of it.
Please leave him alone. 1 WILL NOT turn my back on mv
friends, and my family absolutely will not agree to your
wishes and let Jerry be devoured by you.
John, 1 want no part of your life from here on. And as
Tar as Donna is concerned, 1 could not live with myself if 1
let my sianature Qive Donna more rights to my own child than
i have. Whatever riahts she receives will never be
sanctioned by me.

1 now put Deborah into God's hands (not yours) and pray
that the time will be short when I will be able to be a
complete mother to her. It is truly sad to realize that the
"system" can take away my rights to make decisions for my
dauqhter, just because of my lack of wealth. Maybe if I had
not been so devoted to our relationship for the past eight
years, I would now be more -financially secure. But because
of my devotion to you? I am now broke.
1 have no hard feelings towards David and Corina, and I
hope that when David has his own child he will understand me
better. I pray also that he will have the integrity to stand
for what he honestly knows is riqht.
li this battle is allowed to continue, you will be
destroyinq our dauqhter in order to satisfy your own selfish
desires and insatiable need to control. You have even gone
so far as to overdose Deborah on medication when she is
returned to me, which knocks her completely out cold. 1
cannot let that go on. Nor will I allow you to destroy me.
Y O U are not my Bod, neither are you my husband, and 1 am not
Qoino to be your slave or conform to the demands you make of
me which are bound to reflect on Deborah and destroy her. I
do not want to fight anymore because 1 do not want Deborah
being hurt anymore, i could not stand before God, with my
head held high, knowing that I stopped taking steps to
protect and save my daughter.
Y O U may think you have fooled everyone, but you and 1
know and God knows what you really are. You offer a home
without rent. You offer food, clothing and anythinq else
that a slave-master offers his slaves. This is what you are
tryinq to make of me and everyone around you, wantinq them
to conform to your whims and wishes. And the price we must
pay is Deborah. I think you have been inspired by watchina
Humplestl1tskin movies. He promised to spin straw into qold
at the price of the first-born child. (1 have always
wondered -just what he wanted with the child and 1 can't help
but wonder now.)
bod will be vour

iudqe.

bincerely,

Karen L.

Ihompson

r

r
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APPENDIX B
Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law and Custody

Decree

H U B DISTRICT COURT
Third Jud.o.al D.strict

NOV 1 U 9 9 1

/

Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Plaintiff
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone: 486-9638
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 910903188CS

Plaintiff,
vs.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

On Tuesday November 12, 1991, by order of the Court, a
telephonic
Honorable

pretrial
Timothy

scheduling

conference

R. Hanson presided.

was

held.

Plaintiff

The

John Carl

Putvin ("Putvin") was represented by Mitchell Barker; Defendant
Karen

Larie

Thompson

("Thompson") was represented

by Chase

Kimball; the minor child Deborah Putvin-Thompson ("Deborah") was
represented by Arnold G. Gardner, Guardian ad Litem.
Respective counsel informed the Court of the status of
the case, including Thompson's stated and written desire to
withdraw her answer and proceed by default.

Chase Kimball, on

behalf of Thompson, orally withdrew the Answer and Counterclaim.
The parties, through counsel, stipulated that the Court consider
the court-ordered custody evaluation by Patricia Smith, Phd. and
- 1-

rr

A' H

Thompson's November
hereto)

4, 1991 letter

as evidence

to Putvin

in the case.

Having

(both attached
considered

such

evidence and the pleadings in this case, the Court now enters
its Findings of Fact
1.
Larie

as follows:

The parties to this case, John Carl Putvin and Karen

Thompson, are

the natural parents

of Deborah Putvin-

Thompson, who has been sometimes known in the past as Deborah
Thompson.
2.
custody

Putvin is a fit and proper parent to whom permanent
and control of Deborah should be awarded.

3.

The evidence demonstrates that Thompson may flee with

Deborah, and
treatment.
party

should

be required

to submit to mental health

Visitation should be supervised by a responsible

approved by Putvin, and should be exercised in a location

and environment

conducive

to Deborah's best interests.

The

supervising party should remain at all times in the physical
presence of Deborah, to insure her safety and well-being.
4.

Thompson

should

be

permitted,

after

sufficient

psychological treatment, to present to Putvin or his counsel
such evidence as she

believes establishes that her visitation

should no longer be supervised.
consider such information, and to

Putvin should be required to
make a reasonable determi-

nation as to the continued need for custodial supervision.

If

Thompson shall disagree with Putvin1s determination, she should
then be permitted

to petition the Court, and an evidentiary

- 2-

C0410

hearing shall be held to determine whether the Court should
enter an order relieving her of the requirement of supervised
visitation.
final,

If the Court enters such an order, and it becomes

thereafter

Thompson

should

be

entitled

to

standard

minimal visitation.
5.

The Certification of Live Birth should be corrected

by the State of Utah to identify John Carl Putvin, born December
26, 1948, as the natural father of Deborah, and to correct her
name to read "Deborah Putvin-Thompson".
6.

Arnold

Gardner

should

be

authorized

to

act as

guardian ad litem in the event Thompson shall abduct Deborah.
7.

Putvin should be required to arrange for Deborah to

have psychological treatment.
8. The relationship of the parties was not recognized by
the State of Utah.

Such honorable relationship of conscience as

did exist was terminated by Thompson on May 17, 1991.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
now enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
9.

Sole custody of Deborah should be awarded to Putvin,

subject to visitation by Thompson as set forth in the decree.
10.

The

Certification

of

Live

Birth

pertaining

to

Deborah should be ordered corrected, naming John Carl Putvin,
born December 26, 1948, as the natural father, and correcting
her name to read "Deborah Putvin-Thompson".

11.

A Decree should be entered by the Court, incorpor-

ating the terms of these Findings and Conclusions.

So found and concluded this /

/*

of November, 1991.

By THE 20URT:

Ion. Timothy R. Hanson
Third District Judge

**"' ATTEST

Approved;

By

Chas^4Cimball
Attorney for Thompson

Deputy •-/-.*

U

Arnold Gardner
Attorney and guardian/ad
litem for Deborah
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DISTRICT COURT
Th£i Judical District

1 3 1931

m
|*LT

Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Plaintiff
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone: 486-9638

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
CUSTODY DECREE
Plaintiff,
Case No. 910903188CS
vs.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

On Tuesday November 12, 1991, pursuant to order of the
Court, a pretrial scheduling conference was held by telephone in
this matter.
Plaintiff

The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson was presiding.

John

Carl

(MPutvinM) was

Putvin

represented

by

Mitchell R. Barker; Defendant Karen Larie Thompson ("Thompson")
was

represented

Putvin-Thompson

by

Chase

Kimball;

("Deborah")

was

the minor

represented

child
by

Deborah

Arnold

G.

Gardner, court-appointed Guardian ad Litem.
Respective counsel informed the Court of the status of
the case, including Thompson's

stated

and written desire to

withdraw her answer and proceed with this case by way of a
default matter.

Chase Kimball, Esq., on behalf of Thompson,

then withdrew the Answer and Counterclaim on file in this case.

- 1-

The parties, through counsel (including the guardian ad litem),
stipulated
custody

that the Court

evaluation

November

4,

1991

by

should consider

Patricia

letter

to

Smith,

Putvin

the court-ordered

Phd.

(both

and

Thompson's

attached

to

the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) as evidence in the
case.

Having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, the Court now orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:
1.

Sole permanent custody of Deborah, born May 13,

1988, is hereby awarded to Plaintiff John Carl Putvin.
2.

Reasonable rights of visitation are hereby awarded

to Defendant Karen Larie Thompson.
3.
the

Until stipulation of the parties or further order of

Court,

Thompson's

supervised.

visitation

with

Deborah

must

be

Putvin shall supervise such visitation himself or

shall allow supervision by some responsible party who shall be
previously
exercised

approved

by

Putvin.

Such

visitation

must

be

in a location and environment that is conducive to

Deborah's best interests.

The supervising party shall remain at

all times in the physical presence of Deborah, sufficient to
insure her safety and well-being.
4.
psychological

Thompson

shall

counseling,

submit

by

a

herself

mental

health

to

competent

professional

previously approved by respective counsel.
5.

Thompson

may,

after

sufficient

psychological

treatment, present to Putvin or his counsel such evidence as she
- 2 -

believes

establishes

supervised•
make

that her visitation

should

no

longer

be

Putvin shall consider such information, and shall

a reasonable

determination

she

need for

If Thompson shall disagree with Putvin f s

custodial supervision.
determination,

as to the continued

may

then

petition

the

Court,

and

an

evidentiary hearing shall be held to determine whether the Court
should

enter

an

order

supervised visitation.
and

becomes

relieving

her

of

the

requirement

of

If such an order is entered by the Court

final, thereafter

Thompson

shall

be entitled

to

standard minimal visitation.
6.

Under the circumstances described in paragraph five

above, Thompson
evidence,
hearing.
was

and

shall have the burden of coming forward with
also

shall

have

the

burden

of

proof

at

such

If, upon full hearing, the Court finds that Putvin

unreasonable

in

withholding

his

consent

under

paragraph

five, then the Court may, in its discretion, require Putvin to
reimburse part

or all of Thompson's

attorney

fees

reasonably

incurred in petitioning the Court.
7.

The Certification of Live Birth of Deborah shall be

corrected

by the State of Utah to identify John Carl Putvin,

born December 26, 1948, as the natural father of Deborah, and to
correct her name to read "Deborah Putvin-Thompson".
8.

In the event that Thompson, or her agents or those

acting in concert with her, shall at any time abduct Deborah, or
shall otherwise substantially interfere with Putvin 1 s custodial
- 3 0 J ^ -'

rights, Arnold Gardner is empowered to re-enter the case and
seek relief from this Court as guardian ad litem.
9.

Putvin

shall

submit

Deborah

to

psychological

counseling with a competent child psychologist.
10.

Each party shall bear his /fr

her own costs and

attorney fees in this action,
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THIS

( *

day of

November, 1991.
B!/THE/COURT:

i^-.
on. Timothy R. Hanson
Third District Judge

ATTEST

ChaSe Kimball
Attorney for T

Arnold Gaud
Attorney and guardiag^ad
litem for Deborah

- 4 u -• c4 ~ ^
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APPENDIX C
Arnie Gardner

Affidavit

AFFIDAVIT OF ARNOLD G. GARDNER. JR.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
)
Arnold G. Gardner, Jr., being first duly

sworn upon oath

deposes, and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of

2.

I was appointed to act as Guardian ad Litem for the child

Utah.

Deborah Putvin Thompson in the matter of John Carl Putvin v. Karen
Larie Thompson, case no. 910903188CS, before Judge Hanson in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

That extensive settlement negotiations took place between

John Putvin, represented by Mitchell R. Barker, Karen Thompson,
represented

by

Chase

Kimball

and

Deborah

Putvin

Thompson,

represented by myself, during and preceding November 12, 1991.
4.

On Tuesday, November 12, 1991, a Pre-Trial Scheduling

Conference was held telephonically between all counsel and Judge
Timothy R. Hanson.
5.

Prior to the November 12, 1991, Pre-Trial, a letter from

Karen Thompson was circulated to all parties dated November 4,
1991.

The gist of the letter was that Karen Thompson no longer

wished to litigate the matter.

During the Pre-Trial Conference,

this letter was discussed together with the results of the Court
Ordered Custody Evaluation performed by Patricia Smith, Ph.D.

1

6.

During the discussions with Judge Hanson and counsel, Mr.

Kimball made no indication that he felt he no longer authorized to
act on Karen Thompson's behalf.
the

effect

that

he

did

not

In fact, his statements were to
agree

with

what

his

client

was

instructing him to do, but he felt he had no choice in the matter.
My recollection is, that albeit reluctantly, Mr. Kimball on his
client's behalf agreed that his client's default in the matter
could be entered.

In order to allow his client's default, Mr.

Kimball agreed that her Answer to Mr. Putvin's Complaint could be
withdrawn as well as her Counterclaim in the matter.

Furthermore,

Mr. Kimball agreed that in order to support the Findings of Facts
to be made in this matter as required by law, Karen Thompson's
letter of November 4, 1991, together with the custody evaluation of
Patricia Smith, Ph.D. could be entered as evidence in the matter.
7.

I further recollect that during the telephonic conference

all parties stipulated to the withdrawal of Ms. Thompson's Answer
and Counterclaim and to the entry of her Default and agreed that
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order in the case
would

be

prepared

and

circulated

among

counsel.

It

is

my

recollection that because the matter was settled the matter was
then not set for Trial.
8.

Later in the action, when Mr. Kimball's authority to act

on behalf of Karen Thompson came in to question, Mr. Kimball filed
with the Court an Affidavit a copy of which is attached hereto.
9.

I was relieved of my duties as Guardian ad Litem by the

Court on April 8, 1992.

From the time of my appointment as
2

Guardian ad Litem until my release, there was never any indication
given by any party or counsel that Mr. Kimball was not authorized
to act as counsel of record for Karen Thompson.
DATED this ~ /

day of January, 1994.
LITTL^PIELD & PETER^O)

SUBSCRIBED

AND

SWORN

to

penm,

I

!
1 /*7 v 3 ? * « *

- *
i («( W>*C*\5h * * l
C
1 \ A Vti%& &t
I ^--^-^'''V

Littlerield & Pttersoi
423 South 503 East
SaP Lake City Utah 84102
W
V Commission Expires 12/9/95

My"TTommrs^i^""Expires:

13756.aff\l

3

before

me

this

day

of

APPENDIX D
Motion to Strike,

Motion for Sanctions,
Proof of
Affidavit
of Chase Kimball

Authority,

*t V l f H "J.or

..,\\% "

CHASE KIMBALL, of counsel (4993)
WOODBURY & KESLER
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

^^^r^l

Attorney for Defendants
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

MOTION TO STRIKE
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO REQUIRE
PROOF
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et

alii.

Civil No. 910903188 CS
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
*

COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS, and hereby move this court to
strike the plaintiff's Motion to Require Proof of Authority.
the absence of the striking of said Motion, defendants hereby
respond to said motion in the accompanying memorandum.
Furthermore, as the Motion of plaintiff is obviously improper,
defendant further requests that plaintiff and counsel be
sanctioned pursuant to URCP 11 and UCA §78-27-56.
DATED this

3 f

day of January, 1992.

Chase Kimbal
Attorney for Defendants

In

JKH

Vt

4 b< ft 3L
-••jT

CHASE KIMBALL, of counsel (4993)
WOODBURY & KESLER
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

l(^da<

7

Attorney for Defendants
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO REQUIRE
PROOF OF AUTHORITY

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et

alii,

Civil No. 910903188 CS
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants•
*

COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS, and hereby request the court to
strike the Motion to Require Proof of Authority of plaintiff.
UCA §78-51-33 requires that a party show reasonable grounds for
making the motion, which is not shown in the motion.
Furthermore, plaintiff has complained that defendant's motion for
a hearing on visitation was made without a memorandum of support,
even though the motion had been discussed with the court, and now
plaintiff neglects to prepare a memorandum in support of his own
motion.
In response to the Motion to Require Proof, attached hereto
is the affidavit of Chase Kimball stating his representation of
the defendants has continued from the time he answered the
original complaint.

Pursuant to the above statute, an attorney

may offer his own oath to prove authority.

Furthermore, this

author will produce his client, Karen Thompson, at a hearing to
be held this coming Monday, and the court may satisfy itself that
she is represented by the author at that time.
Counsel for plaintiffs, Mitchell Barker, is acutely aware
that defendants are represented by this author.

He sat next to

this author and argued against a temporary restraining order
against his client as recently as ten days ago.

It is patently

absurd for him to now claim he is unsure as to this author's
authority, and it is embarrassingly obvious that the only reason
for his motion is to delay a hearing on visitation next week.
Barker should be sanctioned pursuant to URCP 11, which
states in part:
The signature of an attorney...constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading,...
that to the best of his knowledge formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law...and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose,... If a pleading...
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion...shall impose...an appropriate sanction.
It is clear to the dullest intellect that the instant action
has one purpose and one purpose only, to harass the defendant and
slow down her process to gain normal healthy unsupervised
visitation with her only child.

This is particularly

reprehensible in view of the fact that he is slowing down the
defendant in order to give his client time to move to Australia
and deny visitation altogether and in perpetuity.
this, and could not fail to know this.

2

Barker knows

UCA §78-27-56 allows for a party to recover his fees from
another party that brings an action in bad faith, to wit:

"In

civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought...in good
faith."

The instant action is a textbook example of a bad faith

action.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion should be stricken as improper, as it
contains neither memorandum, nor a showing of reasonable grounds
for doubt as to whether defendant is represented by this author.
In the absence of the court striking the motion, attached hereto
is the affidavit of this author giving his authority.
Plaintiff and his counsel should be sanctioned for filing
frivolous motions with only an intent to delay behind them.

This

delay becomes much more callous when it is made clear that the
delay will only have the effect of allowing plaintiff to move
10,000 miles away in order to deny reasonable visitation of the
defendant Karen Thompson.
WHEREFORE, defendant requests that the motion of plaintiff
be denied or stricken.

Defendant further requests sanctions be

imposed against plaintiff and his counsel.
DATED this

3 '

day of January, 1992.

Chafed KimBall
Attorney for Defendants

3

O JJ ^J
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CHASE KIMBALL, of counsel (4993)
WOODBURY & KESLER
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
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Attorney for Defendants
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
AFFIDAVIT OF CHASE KIMBALL
Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et

alll.

Civil No. 910903188 CS
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants,
*

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COMES NOW YOUR AFFIANT, CHASE KIMBALL, WHO DULY SWEARS:
1.

That I am a licensed attorney in the state of Utah.

2.

That I am representing defendant Karen Thompson in the

above-entitled case.
3.

The other defendants have been dismissed from this case.

4.

That only ten days ago I was arguing a motion in front

of the court on behalf of Karen Thompson.
5.
argument.

That plaintiff and his counsel were both present at this

6.

That they have absolutely no reasonable grounds to

question that I have authority to represent Karen Thompson, as
they have been dealing with me from the inception in this matter,
or for nigh onto a year.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
January, 1992.
K A

NOTARY PU3L1C I ;

Commission Expires
February 22,1995
UESHELLT.HAUSUAN
x r V S M t e d 4850 North #4

- P 1 ^ 0 t a h 84041

f
i
j
\

w'^-Xi-- * ^ w \ ,

day of

^l/n^nVi a

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he telefaxed a copy of
MOTION, MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT to M. Barker, 2870 S. State,
SLC, UT 84115, and A. Gardner, 426 S. 500 E., SLC, UT 84102 on
the above date.

"j ^ \J

APPENDIX E
Determinative

Statutes

and Rules

custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on trnt investigation
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted hv the Division
of Family Services within 'M days of the courts notice and request for an
investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall complv with Section
78-7-9.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, $ 14: 1992,
c h . 213, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990. substituted

H u m a n ' for "Social in the first sentence.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, added the last sentence and made a
punctuation change,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

of evidence indicating that the child had been
sexually abused by her half-brother. Linam v.
King, 804 P.2d 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Evidence.
Investigation.
— Time for request.

Investigation.

Evidence.
Trial court's finding that child had not been
sexually abused was reversed and the case was
remanded for a redetermination of custody because the finding was against the clear weight

30-3-5.5.

—Time for request.
Husband's request for an investigation was
untimely when he did not request an mvestigation until after the court had decided the case.
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

Petition to protect abused child — Jurisdiction
under this chapter.

( D A person who has filed a complaint under this chapter may also file a
petition with the district court for a protective order for the protection of any
children residing with either party to the action under this chapter. The
petition and procedures shall be the same as for the issuance of protective
orders in the juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6, 78-3a-20.7,
78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10. The court or the cohabitant may use
the protections provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile
Courts, and when necessary, those protections under Title 76, Chapter 5,
Offenses Against the Person, which provide for criminal prosecution.
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order pursuant to this section
shall notify any other court in which another action is pending or order is
issued pertaining to the same family member named in the protective order.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.5, enacted by L.
1991, chl 180, § 1.
"
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991. ch. 180 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const.. Art. VI. Sec. 25.

30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute.
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk in the
register of actions if both the parties who have a child or children and the
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is administered and have completed
attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except
if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of
225

78-45c-ll

JUDICIAL CODE

shall be served with process or otherwise notified in accordance with Section
78-45c-5.
History: L. 1980. ch. 41, § 10.

78-45c-ll.

Ordering party to appear — Enforcement —
Out-of-state party — Travel and other expenses.

(1) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this state to
appear personally before the court. If that party has physical custody of the
child the court may order that he appear personally with the child. If the
party who is ordered to appear with the child cannot be served or fails to obey
the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a
warrant of arrest against such party to secure his appearance with the child.
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is
outside this state with or without the child the court may order that the notice
given under Section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing that party to appear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear
may result in a decision adverse to that party.
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear
under Subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before the court with or
without the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of
the court travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of
the child if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 11.

78-45e-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive
unless modified.
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction
under Section 78-45c-3, binds all parties who have been served in this state or
notified in accordance with Section 78-45c-5 or who have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heardAs to these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and
fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that
determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of thi*
act.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 12.
Meaning of "this act." — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-45c-l.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liability of legal or natural parent, or one who aids and abets, for damages

resulting from abduction of own
A.L.R.4th 7.

700

Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55. 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co.. 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969): Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.
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Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer. 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall. 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R.. 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986i; Penrod v.
Carter. 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. J u r . 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which thev are written. 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to w a r r a n t instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacitv and to w a r r a n t instructions to jurv thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
w a r r a n t instructions to jurv thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement. 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise. 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154."
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products iiabilitv case. 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury. 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial ©=> 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent t h a t the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) A m e n d m e n t . Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-

Rule 52

UTAH RULKS OF ('IVII. PROCEDURE

—Child c u s t o d y .
The trial court must enter specific findings
on the factors relied upon in awarding or modifying the custody of a child. Hutchison v.
Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 < r t a h 1982).
—Contempt.
This rule and § 78-32-3 require, for contempt committed in the presence of the court,
written findings of facts, conclusions of law and
judgment. It is not enough that the court in
open court announce in detail its findings, conclusions and decree. Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah
505, 260 P.2d 544 (1953).
Written findings are necessary to support a
contempt judgment. Thomas v. Thomas, 569
P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977).
—Credibility of witnesses.
Credibility itself is not a factual issue that is
appropriately the subject of the trial court's
findings; rather, the findings of the ultimate
facts implicitly reflect consideration of the believability of the witnesses' testimony. Adoption of McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d
1286 (Utah 1981).
—Denial of motion.
Subdivision (a) does not require that the denial of a motion be accompanied by specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v.
Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984).
—Divorce d e c r e e modifications.
Where the modification of a divorce decree is
granted, the trial court should make findings
to indicate the reasons why modification was
found to be appropriate. Christensen v.
Chnstensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981).
Court action on a request to modify a divorce
decree is not included in those "decisions on
motions" referred to in Subdivision (a), and
therefore the trial court is not exempt from the
requirements of Subdivision (a). Stoddard v.
Stoddard. 642 P.2d 743 ' U t a h 1982); Montoya
v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985).
—Easement.
In a suit to establish right of way for an irrigation ditch by prescriptive easement, where
the pleadings made an issue of whether easement had been acquired and it was clear that
the ditch had been used for more than twenty
years to irrigate lands of plaintiffs, trial court
was required to make a direct finding on that
issue. Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422,
375 P.2d 762 (1962).
—Evidentiary disputes.
Although findings should be made on all material subordinate and ultimate factual issues,
it is not necessary that a court resolve all conflicting evidentiarv issues. Sorenson v. Beers,
614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980).
—Juvenile action.
In juvenile action, court must not only make
findings to support the proof of every fact necessary to constitute the offense charged, but
also make findings to support the preliminary
adjudication that the child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In re R.N., 527
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1974).
—Material issues.
Failure to find upon all material issues
raised by the pleadings is reversible error.
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LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson 18 rta
2d 260. 420 P.2d 615 (1966).
'
^
It is the duty of the trial judge in contests
cases to find facts upon all material issue?'« u
mitted for decision unless findings are wai^ftj
Bover Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (i\
^Uh
1977).
Although findings should be made on all
terial subordinate and ultimate factual issues
it is not necessary that a court resolve ail co
flicting evidentiary issues. In re Estate f
Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 iCt. App. 1989) C ( J
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Harmless error.
Trial court's failure to make findings on
material issue was harmless error where the
evidence was clear, uncontroverted, and only
capable of supporting a finding in favor of the
judgment. Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d ^ 3
(Utah 1983).
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
It is in the discretion of the trial court to
adopt the findings as submitted to that court
by the prevailing party, as long as the findings
are not clearly contrary to the evidence. Boyer
Co. v. Ligneii, 567 P.~2d 1112 (Utah 1977V
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Where a court adopts findings by a state engineer which adequately define the rights of all
parties involved in a water dispute, it is not
necessary for the trial court to make its own.
independent findings of fact and conclusions of
law. In re Use of Water, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363
P.2d 199 (1961).
Amendment.
—Motion.
Caption.
A document entitled "Plaintiffs' Objections
and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law" filed after entry of judgment against plaintiffs was properly construed
by the trial court as a motion pursuant to Subdivision (b) because, regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within 10 days of the
entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the court's findings and conclusions is
properly treated as a post-judgment motion;
the substance of a motion, not its caption, is
controlling. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins.
Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Conformance with original findings.
Where court on its own initiative amended
jury's finding but within 10 days the defendant
filed a motion to amend the judgment back to
conform to the original findings, court had
power, under this rule, to grant the motion.
National Farmers' Union Propertv & Cas. Co.
v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 61
A.L.R.2d 635 (1955).
N e w trial.
Motion for amendment of findings, timely
made and served upon all parties, invokes the
continuing jurisdiction of the court and suspends the finality of the judgment until the
motion is ruled upon; if the interests of justice
require setting aside the findings and judg-

tJuo

o r i tv It. I'KOCKDl'Kr:

1*
rnent of judgment, was not fatal to the defendants' appeal from a proceeding in equity.
Uugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986).
H o w findings e n t e r e d .
In assessing the sufficiency of the findings,
the appellate court is not confined to the contents of a particular document entitled "Findings"; rather, the findings may be expressed
orally from the bench or contained in other
documents. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
This rule does not mandate the entry of
signed, written findings and conclusions. On
the contrary, the court may even state its findings orally if it chooses. Martindale v. Adams,
777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
J u d g m e n t s u p o n multiple c l a i m s or parties.
P u r s u a n t to the requirement of Subdivision
(a) t h a t the trial court "find the facts specially," in order to facilitate appellate review of
judgments certified as final under Rule 54(b),
the trial court should enter findings supporting
the conclusion that such orders are final and
the findings should explain the lack of factual
overlap between the certified and remaining
claims. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137
(Utah 1992).
Judicial review.
On review, the appellate court is not limited
to written findings, and may properly examine
findings expressed solely from the bench or
contained in other court documents, such as
court memoranda. Merriam v. Merriam, 799
P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
—Equity c a s e s .
The "clearly erroneous" standard of review
stated in Subdivision (a) is applicable in equity
cases. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah
1991).
—Standard of r e v i e w .
In reviewing an interlocutory order permitting discovery where issues of fact are involved
and there are no findings of fact, the court does
not review the facts but assumes t h a t the trier
of facts found them in accord with its decision,
and will affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to
support it. Mower v. McCarthv, 122 Utah 1,
245 P.2d 224 (1952).
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against
the great weight of the evidence or if the court
is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced
t h a t a mistake has been made. State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Western
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d
906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State, In re N.H.B.,
777 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Rilev. 784
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d
880 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The "clearly erroneous" standard applies
whether the case is one in equity or one a t law.
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548~(Utah Ct. App.
1987); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776
P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Rilev. 784
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If there is a reasonable basis in PV»/4
1(3
trial court's award of damages will ,bbee ene
affin 7
on appeal, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745
45 p 9 j * ^
(Utah Ct. ADD. 1987). cert d e m ^ P2H
in. **\!
Ct. App. 1987). cert denied 76* D ^
p
1278 (Utah 1988).
'
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Application of the "clearly erroneous"
dard in Subdivision (a) does not e l i m i n a t e d
deference traditionally accorded the fact fi A
to determine the credibility of witnesses S
v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. l 9 ^
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 ( l ' / '
Ct. App. 1988).
'
***
The "clearly erroneous" standard in Subdi
sion (a) applies to review of competency DPn*
ceedings because they are civil rather tha
criminal in nature. State v. Lafferty, 749 P<u
1239 (Utah 1988), atT'd, 776 P.2d _ 63l .Utah
1989).
On appeal of a judgment from the bench af.
ter trial, the appellate court defers to the trial
court's factual assessment unless there is clear
error. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Ap.
pliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988iEskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah
1991).
When reviewing trial court's finding based
solely on written materials and involving no
assessment of witness credibility or competency, the Court of Appeals is in as good a position as the trial court to examine the evidence
de novo and determine the facts, rather than
review the determination under the standard
set forth in Subdivision (a), which would defer
to the trial judge's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses and set aside the finding only if
clearly erroneous. In re Infant Anonymous,
760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
When reviewing a bench trial in a criminal
action for sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the
appellant can show that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law. Western Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d
989 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688
(Utah 1989).
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it
can be shown that they are against the clear
weight of evidence or that they induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Monroe, Inc. v.
Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
A finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed "clearly erroneous"
only if the appellate court concludes that the
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776
P.2d 896 tUtah 1989); In re Estate of Grimm,
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was insufficient to support the findings. Fitzgerald v. Cntchfield. 744 P.2d 301 iUtah Ct.
App 1987 i.
To mount a successful challenge to trial
court findings under Subdivision ta) of this
rule, an appellant must marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings. Only then
can the appellate court determine whether
those findings are clearlv erroneous. Cornish
Town \ . Roller. 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).
The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial that tends to
support the findings and demonstrate why the
findings are clearly erroneous. West Valley
City v. Majestic In v. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
The way to attack findings t h a t appear to be
complete and that are sufficiently detailed is to
marshal the supporting evidence and then
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to
sustain such findings. But where the findings
are not of that caliber, appellant need not go
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather.
appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency of the courts findings as framed. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App.
199U
— F o u n d insufficient.
Divorce case was remanded for adequate
findings on the issues of alimony and fees,
where no findings had been made regarding
the wife's financial condition and needs, and,
although the record contained substantial evidence regarding the parties" financial situation
and the reasonableness of the fees, the findings
were deficient because they failed to evaluate
these factors. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In divorce action, where trial court record
did not reveal whether order regarding assignment of retirement benefit? was intended as an
enforcement or a modification of a previous order, appellate court remanded the issue for the
court below to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Adeiman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d
741 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
V a c a t i o n of j u d g m e n t .
The failure of a trial court to enter adequate
findings requires that the judgment be vacated. Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County
C o m m r s , 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979).
— F o u n d sufficient.
Finding that "claim of plaintiff of the relationship of attorney client is not supported by
the weight of credible evidence and the court
finds said issue in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff' was sufficient in action in
which plaintiff claimed the attorney had established a professional relationship with her and
was t<» purchase property at foreclosure sale for
her; although more detailed factual findings
would have been appropriate, such additional
findings m this case were not mandatory.
Sorensor. -.. Beers, (>14 P.2d 1S9 (Utah 1980)
Sufficient evidence to support the finding as
to division of marital property. See Colman v.
Uolnian. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Findings of fact, based on expert testimony,
and riot "clearly erroneous, accepted on ap-

peal. See O'Brien
Rush, 744 P ^ |
Ct. App. 1987).
In divorce action, value of reti
fits, as found by trial court, s u b a U i ^ * ! *
record. See Canning v. C a n m n g 7 4 ? ] f t * ^
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
^ r
In a fraud action, because there waa
tial competent evidence to support ft]
court's finding t h a t no false reprei
were knowingly made, and because U»
late court was convinced that the h *
made no mistake, the finding was M A .
turbed on appeal. Brown v. Harry H»Hw~.
Inc., 744 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. A p p ^ i S J *
Evidence found sufficient in a bench ttM
support the trial court's judgment r n r n ^
defendant of second-degree murder Slafct
Goodman. 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) / ^ * "
Findings of fact, though not model of dam*
were sufficiently detailed to reveal trial eaat
reasoning processes. See Reid v. Mutual «f
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 19Q»
— O p i n i o n o r m e m o r a n d u m of dedaam
An opinion or memorandum of decision ft**
by a court sitting as trier of the fact Bay at
consulted where the findings of fact and at*
elusions of law are inadequate; and, if ta*
opinion or memorandum contains the findo*
of fact, that is sufficient compliance with Subdivision (a). Sprague v. Boyles Bros. DrilUat
Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956)
A trial judge s memorandum decision can W
regarded as findings of fact but only as to tha»
findings recited therein. Thomas v. Thoma*
569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977).
— R e c i t a l s of p r o c e d u r e s .
"Findings of fact" must be more than aimph
recitals of the procedures involved in thederr
opment of the case. Anderson v. Utah Count*
Bd. of Countv C o m m r s . 589 P.2d 1214 (Utaa
1979).

*Hft

—Technical error.
Trial courts mere clerical oversight in tail
ing to sign its findings and conclusions did «*
require disturbing the judgment. Martindak*
Adams. 777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989i
—Ultimate facts.
Findings should be limited to the ultimate
facts and if thev ascertain ultimate facts, aw
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and th*
evidence to support the judgment, they w " ' ! *
regarded as sufficient Pearson v. Pearson, 56!
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977).
Summary judgment.
Findings of fact are unnecessary in conn**
tion with summarv judgment decisions. TayW*
v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P 2d 163 (Utah I *
App. 1989>.
— S t a t e m e n t of g r o u n d s .
For an appellate court, a statement »
grounds found by the trial court !«»justify summary judgment would be of great assistance,
and in an appropriate case, failure to do so nW ,
justifv remand to the trial court. Masters*Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 -Utah ( t App. W*h
Under Subdivision (ai the trial court is required to make a brief written statement
explain which alternative theory n accepted*
granting summary judgment llmvrver. fal1
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PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
jkje 54. Judgments; costs.
*

fVifinition' form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
W& *P^r D i e adings t the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
fiCI
\ Judgment upon multiple c l a i m s and/or involving multiple p a r t i e s .
«*v more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
J * 0 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
** ilin r\ ^e involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
P * ^ m o r e but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
!SLrmination by the court t h a t there is no just reason for delay and upon an
Zlrnrtss direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina**^!afld direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
hich adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
'•wer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
'-hums or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
i t any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
<c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) J u d g m e n t by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To w h o m awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) H o w a s s e s s e d . The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating t h a t to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and t h a t the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) (Deleted.!
(e) Interest and c o s t s to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
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^ . r a M not a process for appeal »f
, * * 2 f s S T e x rel. State Dep t o. NK-,,,1
• * * ^ U . 742 P2d 114 < Utah t.i. App
, ot award.
L n d u m of costs .s filed before
iff^n^i
costs in specific amounts are
? t o * * t judgment, then a party d.ssatJ S S o « e costs may have the n K ht of
„ .iter or amend the costs in the judKRule 59(a)l3), enjoying thereby the
_ , often days to do so rather than the
**2?ricted period of seven days under
J 2 « i <d*2> of this rule. Nelson v. New-

2jP.2d

601 (Utah 1978K

- • ^ S T ^ ^ i t i o n s were taken but witnesses
^ZuCied at trial, costs of the depositions
* * V^nroDeriy includable within the cost
'TlMl
v Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d
" f taking depositions of defendants
f,tptn*» 0
.^1 -m**ni contractor in materialman's action
* 2 ^ f l 4-2-2 were assessable as costs where
i r T IQ protect plaintiffs rights. Lawson
v ^ f Co v. General Plumbing & Heating
, v ! / 7 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972).
T Wendant was not entitled to the cost of tak^ depositions where the depositions were not
^U i t trial and there was no evidence pre*ottd that they were necessarily incurred for
•w preparation of defendant's case. Nelson v.
v,wman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
<'<*u of depositions are taxable subject to
*m limitation that the trial court is persuaded
•urt they were taken in good faith and, in light
i ihe circumstances, appeared to be essential
'or the development and presentation of the
\m-. deposition costs should be allowable as
«c*«sary and reasonable where the development of the case is of such a complex nature
;^4t discovery cannot be accomplished through
'he leas expensive methods of interrogatories.
-••quests for admissions and requests for the
.fuduction of documents. Highland Constr. Co.
* Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
The party claiming entitlement to the costs
'{depositions has the burden of demonstrating
hat the depositions were reasonably necessary; determining whether that burden is met
» within the sound discretion of the trial court.
•' loyd's Unlimited v. Natures Wav Mktg., Ltd.,
>3 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Discretionary.
Subdivision id) leaves the question of costs
•wmewhat in the discretion of the courts. Hull
v Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245
1955).
The trial court can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs, but
has a duty to guard against any excesses or
abuses in the taxing thereof. Frampton v. Wil•*>n, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980); Hatanaka v.
Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
<»nied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
In modification of divorce decrees under the
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, the
question of the ability or inability of a party to
Pay costs is a factual matter that lies in the

U t i l e .Vl

(iiM.n-t inn ol the trial njuri. Hanlv V Haidv,
77^ P 2<1 <H7 I lab Ct App. I'J^)1
—Expenses of preparation for action.
In a habeas corpus proceeding by parents
against a child-placement agencv to • •htam
custody of a child, expense items incurred by
the agency in the taking of depositions and securing certified copies of a marriage license
and divorce decree in preparing for the action
appeared to be reasonable and incurred in good
faith, and these costs should have been allowed
to the prevailing agency as a matter of course.
Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'v. 12 Utah 2d
235. 364 P.2d 1029 « 196U
The trial court did not err in not awarding
the costs incurred by a wife in a divorce action
who, after the suit was filed, secured the services of an appraiser who was able to testify at
length about his opinion of the identity, nature
and net value of the marital estate after his
inspection of various property and documents.
His research and preparation, although essential to the presentation of the case, could not be
considered a "cost."' Stevens v. Stevens, 754
P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Failure to object.
Defendant waived any error as to the costs
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited
23 days after filing of cost bill before filing any
objection. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d
847 (Utah 1978).
—Liability of state.
The general terms of a statute giving costs to
the prevailing party do not include the state.
Tracy v. Peterson. 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P.2d 393
< 1954).
The state is not liable for costs unless there
is some statute or rule of court which expressly
or by clear implication includes it. Section
78-27-13 does not authorize the taxation of
costs against the state but only provides the
source from which such costs shall be paid
when authorized. Tracv v. Peterson. 1 Utah 2d
213, 265 P.2d 393 (1954).
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Chapter 45a
of Title 78, makes no provision for an award of
costs against the state. State ex rel. State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
—Service on adverse party.
This rule requires that only one verified copy
be served and it is to be served to the court;
there is no requirement that the copy served
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 280
P.2d 926 (1963).
—Statutory limits.
Award of costs in excess of those expressly
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, witness fees and preparation of model, photographs and certified copies of documents was
improper even though the costs represented
the actual expenses incurred; fact that Supreme Court has on occasion approved taxing
of expense of depositions as costs should not be
taken as opening the door to other expenses of
the character claimed in the instant case.
Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of
process expenses are chargeable only in accor-
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^*«*rea«*>n for deIay*
. L ,-**
nt to the requirement m .subdivision
" ' T ' f w e trial court "may direct the entrv of
*
I iudzment ... only upon an express de* ***^ uon bv the court that there is no just
igt9$
\<r
delay ' and, because this determina* • * * ' S t e t n a l court is subject to judicial re*** nder an abuse of discretion standard, a
' ^ ^ o U n a t i o n should accompany all future
Actions so that the appellate court may
*"lJ.n
informed decision on that question.
^ * ^ v . Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 1.T7 (Utah
o-view of finality.
t v t initial question of whether an order is
bfc for certification under Subdivision (b),
' W h e t h e r the order is "final," is a question
4\** Therefore, the appellate court will rethe trial court's decision on this point for
,r*ctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax
;£m'n, 814 P.2d 1099 U991).
_a«parate claims.
When the degree of factual overlap between
.-* i*«ue certified for appeal and the issues renaming in the trial court is such that separate
,*im* appear to be based on the same operate facts or on the same operative facts with
Juoor variations, they are not separate claims
JC purposes of Subdivision tb). Kennecott
\*p. v. State Tax Coramn, 814 P.2d 1099
•i91); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank. 823
r»2d 1065 (Utah 1992).
To be eligible as an appealable order under
subdivision ib), the courts ruling must dispose
u "separate claim." A "separate claim" must
irue from different facts than those underlyr»* the remaining causes of action. Webb v.
Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (1991).
Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action, all
4 which arose out of the same set of operative
'4Cta, constituted only one "claim" for purposes
i this rule. Furniture Distribution Ctr. v.
Milea, 821 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1991).
A claim is not separate if a decision on
Uima remaining in the trial court would ren!«T moot the issues on appeal. Bennion v.
^nnzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992).
Pursuant to the requirement of U.R.C.P.
r
'2(a) that the trial court "find the facts spe:aliy," in order to facilitate appellate review of
»judgment certified as final under Subdivision
y of this rule, the trial court should enter
endings supporting its determination that
*uch an order is final and the findings should
M
*plain the lack of factual overlap between the
*rtified and remaining claims. Bennion v.
'>nnzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992).
Where the substance of plaintiffs lawsuit
*aa that defendant defamed him several times,
•*ach alleged defamation was a separate injury
•nving rise to a separate and distinct claim: the
r
**Hution of a given libel claim arising from
>ne statement would not have a res judicata
*nect on other libel claims arising from other
statements and therefore such claims could be
severed from the claim remaining before the
trial court. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835
^•2d 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
lD

rvP s i s t e n t

oral statements

-

^rol statements of opinion by the trial court

:-> i

inconsistent .vith lh»- lit, iinu.- m i . •« «f vi u- n i»is
ultimately renrjerrd <io not .ifteri «rw final
judgment. MeCollum v. (lothier. 121 Utah
311. 241 P 2 d

4tfh . 1!>52J.

I n t e r e s t on j u d g m e n t .
Interest follows a judgment -L> a .-nailer ot
law and is collectible even thouuh the clerk of
court fails to include the same in the judgment
signed by him. Dairy Distnbs.. Inc. v. Local
976. Western ('oiiference of Teamsters, hi
Utah 2d 85. :J9H P 2d 47 (1964).
In an action on an oral contract, a party's
failure to specifically plead a request for prejudgment interest was of no consequence because the interest issue is injected by law into
every action for the payment of past due
monev. Fitzgerald v. Critchtield, 744 P.2d 301
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
When a judgment is reversed on appeal, the
new judgment subsequently entered by the
trial court may bear interest only from the
date of entry of that new judgment. Mason v.
Western Mtg. Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
J u d g m e n t based on unpleaded theory.
Where plaintiff alleged only an express contract and he sought no amendment of his
pleadings nor offered any proof to establish a
quantum meruit theory, court erred in granting judgment for plaintiff based on the theory
of quantum meruit. Taylor v. E.M. Rovle Corp.,
1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 Q953).
Although a complaint may sound in contract, it is not prejudicial error for a court to
allow recovery on the basis of q u a n t u m meruit,
where defendant was not denied a fair opportunity to meet the change in theory of recovery.
PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n
Chips, Inc.. 28 Utah 2d 350. 502 P.2d 562
(1972).
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was defective because of the nature of relief sought even
though it did not demand judgment for personal liability on contract and judgment was
granted for such personal liability, since this
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the
relief to which a party is entitled even though
it is not demanded. Motivated Mert. Int'l v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979).
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the
corporation where the issues upon which such
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. W a r r e n s Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984).
J u d g m e n t in favor of n o n p a r t y .
Subdivision (cnl) is consistent with the general principle that a trial court may not render
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can
generally make a legally binding adjudication
only between the parties actually joined in the
action. Hiltslev v. Rvder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah
1987).
Subdivision (c)(1) cannot dispense entirely
with the necessity that a claimant make some
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987).
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty.
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600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979); Myers v. Morgan,
^26 P 2d 410 (Utah 1981). Bernard v.
Atteburv, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Bailey v.
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P 2d 1043 (Utah 1984);
GMAC v Martinez, 712 P.2d 243 (Utah 1986);
Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986);
Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986);
Tebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 735 P.2d
1305 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92
(Utah 1986); Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank.
738 P 2 d 614 (Utah 1987); Crosland v. Peck,
738 P.2d 631 ' U t a h 1987); Elder v. Triax Co.,
740 P 2 d 1320 (Utah 1987); Mascaro v. Davis,
741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Payne ex rel. Payne
v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); McKee v.
Williams, 741 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah
1987); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1987>: Kathv's Food Stores. Inc. v Equitable Lite & Cas. Ins. Co.. 753 P 2d 501 < Utah
1988); Williams v. Public Serv Comm'n. 754
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); OK Motors. Inc. v. HilL
762 P 2 d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112
i Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d
1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Citv Consumer
Serv.. Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 Utah 1991);
Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah
1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co.,
818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); Peterson v. Peterson,
818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Quinn v.
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d
858 (Utah 1992); Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1
( U t a h C t . App. 1992); J.H. ex rel. D.H. v. West
Vallev City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple
Claims Under Rule 54(b); A Time for Reexamination?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. J u r . 2d Appeal and
Error $ 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. J u r . 2d Costs
§§ 14. 26 to 36, 87 et seq.; 46 Am. J u r . 2d Judgments $ 1.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error $$ 46 to
166; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 1.
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for
expenses incurred in relation to services for client, 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.L.R.4th 256.
Effect on compensation of architect or building contractor of express provision in private
building contract limiting the cost of the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Recoverability under property insurance or
insurance against liability for property damage of i n s u r e d s expenses to prevent or mitigate damages. 33 A.L.R.3d 1262.
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling defendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66
A.L.R.3d 1087.
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing
party" for purposes of awarding costs where
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66
A.L.R.3d 1115.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Allocation of defense costs between primary
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th
107.
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or
other sanctions against attorney who fails to
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial. 29
A.L.R.4th 160.
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Modern status of state court rules governing
entry of judgment on multiple cairns, 80
A.L.R.4th 707.
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R.
Fed. 168.
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on
multiple claims. 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error <$= 24 to
135; Costs <5=» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.;
Judgment <s=> 1.

Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and t h a t fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his
default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event t h a t it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the
nondefaulting party.
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Judgment.
Judgments by default are not tavored by the
courts nor are thev in the interest of justice
and fair play. Heathman v Fabian &
Clendenin. 14 Utah 2d m. All P.2d 189 < 1962).
—Conduct of c o u n s e l .
When defendant's counsel was 27 minutes
late on morning trial was commenced because
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme
Court a writ of prohibition to prevent the holding of the trial on that day due to absence of
defense witnesses, the trial court erred in
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiffs evidence, notwithstanding any ill-advised, irritating or contemptuous conduct from defense
counsel during the action, since the law prefers
that a case be tried on its merits and the parties litigant should not be made to suffer for
the misconduct of their counsel. McKean v.
Mountain View Mem. Estates, Inc., 17 Utah 2d
323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966).
Default e n t r y n e c e s s a r y .
No default judgment may be entered under
Subdivision (b)(2) unless default has previously been entered. The entry of default is an
essential predicate to any default judgment. P
& B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Failure to follow rule.
Rule 54(c>(2) and this rule prescribe the procedure to be followed by trial courts in entering
judgments against defaulting parties, and
courts are not at liberty to deviate from those
rules just because one party is in default and is
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the
case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah
1984).
Judgment against defaulting party must be
reversed where plaintiffs' claims for damages
were not for sums certain and a hearing was
not conducted by the trial court to ascertain
the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs
were entitled. Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d
1193 (Utah 1984).
The entry of a default judgment by a court
with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, where there is no default in law or
in fact, is improper and voidable. P & B Land,
Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
—Hearing on merits.
No one has an inalienable or constitutional
right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the merits. The courts, in the interest of
justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on
the merits of every case. Heathman v. Fabian,
14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962).
—Punitive d a m a g e s .
Lower court's award of punitive damages
without proof and upon default judgment was
i
n and of itself justification for vacating judgment. Securitv Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
West, 20 Utah 2d 292. 437 P.2d 214 (1968).
Notice.
This rule provides that a party in default
ne
«d not be given notice of the entry of default
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judgment. Central Bank & Trust Co. v Jensen,
656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982L
S e t t i n g a s i d e default.
An entry of default may be set aside under
this rule for good cause shown by the court;
once a judgment by default has been entered,
however, it may be set aside only in accordance
with Rule 60(b). Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson,
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982>.
Once a default judgment has been entered, it
can only be set aside in accordance with Rule
60(b). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Collateral attack.
Where affidavit for publication of summons
presented no evidentiary facts, a default judgment entered against the defendant could be
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
Where affidavit for publication of summons
contained some evidence upon which the order
for publication of summons could reasonably
be based, a default judgment against the defendant could not be attacked collaterally, even if
the evidence was insufficient to persuade the
judge or clerk of the necessarv facts. Bowen v.
Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
—Direct attack.
An action brought to vacate a default judgment on ground that service of summons by
publication was obtained by fraud is a direct
and not a collateral attack. Bowen v. Olson,
122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
—Discretion of court.
A trial court is endowed with considerable
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a
motion to set a default judgment aside. Board
of Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806
(1963).
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on three occasions before three different judges and his motions were denied in the first two proceedings,
the third judge was barred by the law of the
case from overruling the previous orders.
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).
—Grounds.
Excusable neglect.
A default certificate may be set aside upon
grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v.
Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962).
While reliance on an attorney's assurances
that one's rights are being protected could, in
the appropriate circumstances, be seen as excusable neglect, trial court properly refused to
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to
establish that she was so represented. Miller v.
Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
—Judicial attitude.
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor
granting relief from a default judgment, unless
to do so would result in substantial prejudice or
injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).
—Movant's duty.
Party who seeks to have a default judgment
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(4) Newly discovered evi(ience, material for the partv making the application, which he could not. with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served mav be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59. F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, $ 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial.
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
—Punitive damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Filing of affidavits.
Grounds for new trial.
—Particularization in motion.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.
Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.
Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment.
Time for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.

Cited.
A b a n d o n m e n t of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab. Inc., 694 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
This section requires that the moving party
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers
v. Gene's Bldg. Materials. Inc.. 567 P.2d 174
(Utah 1977).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of
the defendant's expert witness where the
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either
before, or immediately after, it was given.
Jensen v. Thomas. 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977>.
A ''surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison 'an.J).
Anderson v. Bradley. 590 P.2d ;$:J9 (Utah
1979).
Failure to interpose a timely objection to testimony challenged on the ground of surprise
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion
for a new trial on that ground. Chournos v.
D'Agmllo. 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982).
Claim of error based on accident or surprise,
never brought to the attention ot the trial court
by objection, motion to strike, motion for a new
trial, or otherwise, was asserted for the first
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is well established. This discretion is necessary
to allow the court an opportunity to cause reexamination or correction of jury verdicts or findings which it believes to be in error, or where
there is substantial doubt that the issues were
fairly tried. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co..
15 Utah 2d 257. 391 P.2d 290 (1964).
Granting of a plaintiffs motion for a new
trial after a jury verdict for the defendant in a
rear-end collision case was not an abuse of discretion on the theory that the verdict for the
plaintiff at the second trial showed conclusively that there were jury questions and that
the motion therefore should have been denied
after an errorless first trial. Brown v. Johnson.
24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970).
A ruling on a motion for a new trial will not
be disturbed on appeal except when there is a
clear abuse of the court's discretion. Jensen v.
Thomas. 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); Lembach v.
Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981), overruled in
part on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey, 728
P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
On review of a trial court's denial of a motion
for a new trial alleging an excessive jury
award, the Supreme Court's function is limited
to a determination of whether the trial court's
denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion.
Batty v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1978).
Orders granting or denying motions for a
new trial will not be reversed by the Supreme
Court unless there has been a manifest abuse
of discretion. Schmidt v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
Both the granting of, and the refusal to
grant, a new trial is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge, and the decision will be
reversed only if the judge has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably. Christenson v.
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988).
A trial court has no discretion to grant a new
trial absent a showing of at least one of the
circumstances specified in Subdivision ta).
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W.
Constructors. Inc., 765 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The trial court has broad discretion to grant
or deny a motion for a new trial. Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Effect of order granting n e w trial.
An order granting a new trial is not a final
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and
places the parties in the same position as if
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v.
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P 2d 736 (1964).
Effect of untimely motion.
When an untimely motion for a new trial is
made, the trial court's only alternative is to
deny the motion; an untimely motion for a new
trial has, however, no effect on the running of
the time for filing a notice of appeal. Burgers v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
In an action for injuries to a child who was
struck by the defendant's automobile, evidence
relating to the time when the defendant saw
the child and to his precautions to avoid the
child was ample to support a verdict for the
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child: and. therefore, it was proper to grant a
new trial on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to justify a verdict of no cause of
action. Holmes v. Nelson. 7 Utah 2d 435, 326
P.2d 722 M<»58).
Where a verdict is not justifiable under the
evidence, the remedy is to order modification of
the verdict and the adverse party is given the
choice of accepting it or taking a new trial; this
alternative does not infringe upon right to trial
by jury. Bodon v. Suhrmann. N ('tan 2d 42. 327
P.2d 826 il95Hi.
Where there are divergent elements of competent evidence before the jury, its findings
based on its belief as to which preponderates
will be respected on appeal; however, the verdict must be supported by some competent evidence. Weber Basin Water Conservancv Dist.
v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79. 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
Trial court did not abuse its discretionary
power in refusing a new trial on the ground of
insufficient evidence to support the verdict
where reasonable men could draw different
conclusions
from
conflicting
evidence.
Pollesche v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah
2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972).
Where the trial court has denied a motion for
new trial claiming insufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there was an evidentiary
basis for the jury's decision and will be reversed only if the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight
and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v.
Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Eerbert &
Jaynes v. R.C. Tolman Constr. Co., 680 P.2d
746 (Utah 1984).
Where the trial court has granted a new trial
motion based on insufficiency of evidence, its
decisions will be sustained on appeal if the
record contains substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict for the
moving party. Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 P.2d 730
(Utah 1982)"; Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d
530 ' U t a h 1984).
In breach of contract action against a construction company, based upon allegedly defective workmanship in drilling a well, there was
an evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling
in the defendant's favor where a videotape of
the well site and expert testimony indicated
that there was no proof of defective workmanship, and that problems with the well could
have been caused by factors outside of the defendant's control. Egbert & J a v n e s v. R.C.
Tolman Constr. Co.. 680 P.2d 746 (Utah 1984).
When a new trial is granted based on the
weight of the evidence, the standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling is much narrower than the trial court s standard in granting the new trial. Goddard v. Hickman. 685
P.2d 530 .Utah 1984).
The decision of the trial court to grant a new
trial will not be disturbed on appeal when the
record contains substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict in favor of
the moving party. This substantial evidence
standard requires that the evidence be sufficient in amount and credibility that, when considered in connection with the other evidence
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punitive d a m a g e s .
"~Any motion for a new trial on the question ot
Hve damages requires that the t n a i court
^ ^ g e in a two-part inquiry: m whether puni2- a r e appropriate at all. i.e.. whether the
UV,
dence is sufficient to support a lawful jury
finding of defendant's requisite mental state;
\ u i (ii) whether the amount of punitives is ex^ i v e or inadequate, appearing to have been
under the influence of passion or prejugiven
djce. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789
( Utah 1991).
If the ratio of punitive to actual damages
falls within the range that the Supreme Court
has consistently upheld, then the trial court
may assume that the award is not excessive. In
denying a Subdivision (a)(5) motion for a new
trial, the trial court need not give any detailed
explanation for its decision if the punitive
damage award falls within this ratio range. If
the award exceeds the ratios set by the past
pattern of decision, the trial court is not bound
to reduce it. However, if such an award is upheld, the trial judge must make a detailed and
reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the award is not excessive in light
of the law and the facts. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
The general rule appears to be that where
the punitives are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to
actual damages have seldom been upheld by
the Supreme Court and that where the award
is in excess of $100,000, the court has indicated
some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than 3 to 1. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Failure to object to f i n d i n g s of fact.
The failure to object to the findings of fact, in
the form of a motion for a new trial or amendment of judgment, was not fatal to the defendants' appeal from a proceeding in equity.
Dugan v. Jones. 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986).
Filing of affidavits.
Motion for new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence was properly denied by the
lower court where movant did not comply with
Subdivision (c) in timely filing an affidavit.
Thorley v. Kolob Fish & G a m e Club, 13 Utah
2d 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962).
G r o u n d s for n e w t r i a l .
In passing on a motion for a new trial, if the
trial court cannot reasonably find that the jury
erred, it should deny the motion. On the other
hand, if the trial court can reasonably conclude
that there was insufficient evidence to justify
the verdict or it is manifestly against the
weight of the evidence in violation of Subdivision (a)(6) or that the jury acted with passion
or prejudice contrary to Subdivision (a)(5), it
may grant the motion and order a new trial.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789
'Utah 1991).
A motion for a new trial challenging the
amount of a punitive damage award is most
appropriately brought under
Subdivision
f
a)(5), while a motion challenging an award of
hard actual damages is more appropriately
brought under Subdivision (a)(6). Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
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— P a r t i c u l a r i z u t i o n in m o t i o n .
The onlv purpose tor requiring yarticulanzation of grounds upon which a motion tor new
trial is made is to inform the court and the
other party of the theories upon which the new
trial is sought, and where defendant filed an
affidavit with his motions setting forth his theories and where the judgment was on the
pleadings in the original case the court and
parties were sufficiently advised as to the
grounds for the motion. Howard /. Howard, LI
Utah 2d 149. 356 P.2d 275 (I960).
Arguments that affidavits and unpublished
depositions "clearly establish the injustice that
will be accomplished if said summary judgment is allowed to stand" and that the granting of the motion would be "in the interest of
judicial economy and efficiency"' did not constitute a "showing" of any of the circumstances
specified by the provisions of Subdivision (a).
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W.
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 i Utah Ct. App.
1988).
I n c o m p e t e n c e o r n e g l i g e n c e of c o u n s e l .
While the general rule is t h a t in civil cases a
new trial will not be granted based upon the
incompetence or negligence of o n e s own trial
counsel, there are cases which recognize that
under exigent or exceptional circumstances
which appear to have resulted in an injustice,
the court may be justified in granting a new
trial; however, mere differences in the theory
of trial techniques are not sufficient to warrant
a new trial on the basis of incompetence or negligence of trial counsel. J e n n i n g s v. Stoker, 652
P.2d 912 (Utah 1982).
Misconduct of jury.
Claim of misconduct of the jury based upon
affidavits of jurors that one of their number
had performed an independent test at the scene
of the injury in question and that such test
influenced the decision of such juror did not
meet the requirements for jury misconduct set
out bv this rule. Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d
240. 408 P.2d 709 (1965).
Although Subdivision (a)(2) allows for a new
trial on the grounds of misconduct of the jury,
with very limited exceptions, the conduct and
deliberations in the jury room cannot be impeached, as it would be impracticable and lead
to endless mischief to examine into the discussions and deliberations of the iurv. Hathawav
v. Marx. 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850 (1968).
Affidavits of five jurors which tended to show
that the jury misconstrued and misunderstood
the instructions were not sufficient grounds for
a new trial since affidavits had to be based on
the misconduct specified in Subdivision (a)(2),
and jurors cannot impeach their verdict by
what was said or done in the jury room.
Stringham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425 (Utah
1974); Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 746
P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).
Affidavits from jurors which would indicate
that the jury was confused as :o the applicable
law as enunciated by the court in its instructions or that they disregarded the law in arriving at a verdict would not substantiate a claim
of misconduct within the meaning of Subdivi-
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the time of trial. In re Disconnection of ( Vrtain
Territory, 66* P.2d 544 <l'tah 1983>.
Party was not entitled to a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence that could not
have been discovered and produced at trial.
where the new evidence was merely cumulative to that elicited at trial with no new findings apparent so that there was no likelihood
that the outcome of the trial would have been
different if this evidence had been available.
Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984 >.
Newly discovered evidence must be material,
competent evidence which is in fact newly discovered. Secondly, it must be such that it could
not, by due diligence, have been discovered and
produced at trial. Finally, it must not be
merely cumulative or incidental, but must be
ofsufficient substance that there is reasonable
likelihood that with it there would have been a
different result. In re S.R.. 735 P.2d 53 (Utah
1987).
Where, in post-judgment motions, the appellant claimed to have the articles of incorporation, the certificate of incorporation, minutes of
the organizational meeting, checkbook records,
stock transfers, and agreements between different companies available to prove his claim,
it was held difficult to see how any of this could
constitute "newly discovered evidence" as he
claimed, particularly in view of his having
signed five and six-year-old corporate minutes
the day prior to trial. Walker v. Carlson, 740
P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Newly discovered evidence must relate to
facts in existence at the time of trial and cannot be based upon facts occurring after trial.
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183
(Utah 1990).
A deed executed after trial and thus not in
existence at the time of trial is not newly discovered evidence. Hancock v. Planned Dev.
Corp., 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990).
New trial on initiative of court.
The 10-day time period in Subdivision (d)
cannot be enlarged. Boskovich v. Utah Constr.
Co., 123 Utah 387. 259 P.2d 885 (1953).
Requirement that trial court shall specify
the grounds therefor when ordering a new trial
of its own initiative is satisfied by specifying
the general grounds provided in the Rules of
Civil Procedure; such order need not be supported by detailed findings of fact. Goddard v.
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984).
Procedure for questioning grant of n e w
trial.
If a trial court's authority with respect to a
motion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily,
the proper redress is either in a petition for
interlocutory appeal, which may be granted in
a proper case, or in the preservation of error for
review, if necessary, upon the final outcome of
the case. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185,
389 P.2d 736 (1964).
Reconsideration of motion for n e w trial.
The Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide
for a motion for the trial court to reconsider or
review its ruling granting or denying a motion
f°r a new trial, and where the trial court
granted a motion for a new trial in a negli-
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^L-nce action pursuant to regular procedure,
and no inadvertence, mistake, nr irregularity
appeared (Rule 601 in connection with the obtaining of the order, the court had not authority to entertain and grant a motion ro reconsider or review its ruling. Drurv v Luneeford,
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 i 196B>.
Settlement bars appeal.
Settlement of default judgment bv parties'
California counsel barred appeal from denial of
motion under this rule, ('live v. Mason, 605
P.2d 7H:i (Utah 198()>.
Summary judgment.
A motion for a "new'' trial following summary judgment is procedurally correct and
available to litigants. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v.
Ultrasystems W Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Interstate Land
Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 ' U t a h Ct.
App. 1990).
Time for motion.
Rule 60(b) may not be used to extend the
time in which a motion may be filed pursuant
to this rule. Goddard v. Bundv. 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952).
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc predating a motion for a new triai that is untimely
filed so that the motion will be timelv. Kettner
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962).
Pursuant to Rule 5(d), which allows the filing of any paper after the complaint required
to be served upon a party w i t h m a reasonable
time after service, a motion filed with the court
two days after service is timely. Dehm v.
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).
Tolling time for appeal.
A timely motion under this rule terminates
the running of the time for appeal of a judgment, and time for appeal does not begin to run
again until the order granting or denying such
a motion is entered. Hume v. Small Claims
Court, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979); Interstate
Land Corp. v. Patterson. 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
An unsigned minute entry is not a final
judgment for purposes of appeal. The time for
appeal from a judgment, toiled by a party's
timely post-judgment motion, starts to run on
the date when the trial court enters its signed
order, denving the motion. Gallardo v.
Boiinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Waiver.
Where the verdict made no award of general
damages and was deficient in form, plaintiffs
failure to demand that the jury be sent back for
further deliberations, and her failure to object
to the verdict at a bench conference regarding
the correctness of the verdict constituted
waiver of her ngh^ to a new trial or to appeal
the verdict. Conn v. J.C. Penney Co.. 537 P.2d
306 (1975).
Where a special verdict failed to mention
damages in regard to one part of a cause of
action but the plaintiff failed to raise this insufficiency before the jury was discharged, the
issue was deemed waived and could not be
raised in a motion for new trial. Ute-Cai Land
Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
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for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
** *LA Don the defendant as required by Rule l'e» and the defendant has
* ef wTto appear in said action; i5) the judgment is void: <6> the judgment has
fa ilea
^ ^ released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
__ J or otherwise
«.i
.
. „ j .or
^ | t j s n o | o n i r e r equitable that
be*n
«pA has been reversed
vacated,
*^Tiudgment should have prospective application: or <7 anv other reason
fving relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
j
h'n a reasonable time and for reasons 11), '2), I.'JK or '4>, not more than 3
'** ths after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
n
°tion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
m
oend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enterf ^ n a n independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or prodding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
htaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
niles or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
.... 1)o< F.R.C.P.

Cross-References.
aside judgment

l0 set

Fee tor filing motion
21-1-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Any other reason justifying relief."
tkfault judgment.
Impossibility of compliance with order.
Incompetent counsel.
I j c k of due process.
Merits of case.
Mistake or inadvertence.
Real party in interest.
\ppeals.
« lyrical mistakes.
Computation of damages.
Correction after appeal.
-Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
Katate record.
Inherent power of courts.
Intent of court and parties.
Judicial error distinguished.
Order prepared by counsel.
Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
r
Vfault judgment.
.'Tect of set-aside judgment.
Admissions.
Kraud.
-Divorce action.
Korm of motion,
independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
-Divorce decree.
-Fraud or duress.
- Motion distinguished,
invalid summons.
-Amendment without notice,
inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
•mtake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
3«fault judgment.
Illness.
——Inconvenience.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
^Delayed motion for new trial.
- F a i l u r e to file cost bill.

—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.
Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
" A n y o t h e r r e a s o n justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief: and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. Laub v South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657
P.2d 1304 tUtah 1982V. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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pndered. trial * our t ,s denial uf defendant's mor on to set aside detault judgment on grounds
laintirt'Wfh not the real partv m interest, under Subdivision «hn7» of this rule, was supnorted bv evidence that plaintitT was the real
l^j-ty in interest and that defendant had
knowledge thereof. Robinson v. Myers. 599
p.2d 513 (Utah 1979).
Appeals.
&n order denying relief under Subdivision
,b) is a final appeaiable order. Moreover, imnroper or untimely motions do not toll the time
for appeal from final orders. Arnica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schettier. 768 P.2d 950 I Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of d a m a g e s .
Where damage award was based on the sum
of four separate amounts listed in a letter exhibit, and the sum of the amounts was in error,
the error was within the definition of a clerical
mistake and was subject to correction by the
trial court. Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins.
Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).
—Correction after appeal.
Trial court may correct clerical error made
in recording of decree after Supreme Court has
affirmed erroneous decree on appeal. Bagnali
v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah
1978).
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
Where later judgment was void and different
from earlier valid judgment, no appeal could be
taken on ground that defendants were appealing from the earlier judgment and that insertion of date of void judgment was merely a clerical error which court could correct. Nunley v.
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126,
388 P.2d 798 (1964).
—Estate record.
The correction of the record in an estate is
properly made in the probate court in which
the errors occurred, and the court was justified
in accepting parol evidence as to the incorrectness of the record. Harmston v. Harmston, 5
Utah 2d 357, 302 P.2d 270 (1956).
—Inherent p o w e r of courts.
The courts of this state had recognized the
inherent right of a court to enter a judgment
nunc pro tunc to correct clerical errors. Frost v.
District Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 96
Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938).
—Intent of court and parties.
The correction contemplated by Subdivision
'a> of this rule must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the
court and parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d
401 (Utah 1984).
—Judicial error distinguished.
The distinction between a judicial error and
a
clerical error does not depend upon who made
l
U rather, it depends on whether it was made
»n rendering the judgment (judicial error) or in
recording the judgment as rendered (clerical
e
rror>. Richards v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314,
47
* P-2d 143 (1970).
Question of whether an error is "judicial" or
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"clerical" depends not on v. ho made it. hul on
vvhether it was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment. Lindsay \.
Atkin, *>S0 P.LM 101 (Utah I'JMi.
— O r d e r p r e p a r e d by c o u n s e l .
Krroneous assumption by judge in signing
order that the order as prepared bv counsel correctly reflected his judgment was a mistake of
a perfunctorv or clerical nature which the
court could and properly did correct upon Hs
own motion. Meagher v. Lquitv Oil Co., 5 Utah
lid l ( J6. 299 P 2 d 827 < I9n6i."
— P r e d a t i n g of n e w trial motion.
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc predating a motion for new trial that is untimely
filed so that the motion will he timelv. Kettner
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962).
Court's discretion.
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment
under Subdivision <bi, and its determination
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Default judgment.
Once a default judgment has been entered, it
can only be set aside in accordance with Subdivision ib). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettier. 768
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Subdivision (bi does not provide t h a t as part
of the order setting aside a judgment any admissions are also set aside: those matters are
covered exclusively by a motion made as provided by Rule 36(b). Whitaker v. Nikols, 699
P.2d 685 (Utah 1985).
Fraud.
—Divorce action.
Motion to set aside provisions of divorce decree concerning child custody and support
based upon allegation that wife had perpetuated a fraud upon the court by falsely claiming
husband was child's father did not comply with
Subdivision (b) and should have been denied.
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494
P.2d 283 (1972).
The wife in a divorce action was entitled to
have the decree set aside on the ground of
fraud where the assets of the parties may have
been more than five times the amount disclosed by the husband who prevented the wife
from gaining full and accurate knowledge of
his total assets by transferring his corporate
holdings to family members without relinquishing
control
of those
assets,
by
understating the true value of jointly held
property, and by avoiding compliance with
court-ordered discovery. Bovce v. Bovce. 609
P.2d 928 (Utah 1980)'
Form of motion.
Trial court did not err in vacating judgment
in response to defendants' supplemental statement of objections, which, though clearly mislabeled, was the functional equivalent of a motion to set aside the judgment under Subdivision (b), was filed in contemplation of the rule,
contained the same kinds of arguments and assertions one would normally expect to find in a
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set aside default judgment .»n
w
_ . "* excusable neglect was not error
^ • • • J f e n d a n t failed to contact his counsel
• ^ ^ b r u a r y to time of trial in September.
*•?Jltasel did not attempt to contact deten^ ^ t i l ten days before trial even though
ffjf K^d long been informed of approximate
rftrial notwithstanding claim that coun« • • * unable to contact defendant due to de#•« lone working hours and his custom of
l » i v i * &
.. ,4.u
^ _ ^ his wife who was terminally ill with
^ ^ A i r k e m Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker,
• j r g i i T 2 d 65, 513 P.2d 429| U973).
Urfion for relief from default judgment was
\Z^\Y denied to cosigner (father) who
J
^ P ^ i that his son was the proper defendant
, U)0 | c n 0 steps to file an answer to the comb a t . Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers. 534
? * | 616 (Utah 1975).
\ trial court is justified in denying relief
-fom a default judgment because of lack of
, {Dm\y request, long passage of time before
iaJung such request, general procedural ne*i«t, urgence of hypertechnicality about a
Tutute, or an almost complete absence of subUAUC* or merit in the relief for which he
pr»yed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah
J75K
Motion to set aside default judgment was
properly denied in case where defendant of(fid no reasonable excuse for his nonappearance failed to respond to repeated attempts to
onuct him regarding status of the lawsuit he
krww was pending, and knew that a hearing
h*d been scheduled and that his counsel had
withdrawn. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855
I'Uh 1979).
Where defendant claimed default judgment
«*• due to his attorney's failure to communicate with him, and the record showed that defendant failed to contract his attorney for one
*nd half years after he filed his answer and
counterclaim, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to set
*ude the default judgment. Gardiner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982).
In order for defendant to be relieved from a
Wault judgment, he must not only show that
the judgment was entered against him through
*ny reason specified in Subdivision ib>. but he
mint also show that his motion to set aside the
judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action. A meritorious defrnae is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would
Have resulted in a judgment different from the
one entered. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of
•^arial Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053
'Utah 1983).
Default judgment should not have been enured in tort case arising out of injuries inducted upon plaintiff by defendant where contradictions surrounding adequacy of service of
process and other factors resulted in genuine
mistake on part of defendant, in the absence of
*nich the default would not have occurred.
f
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^eiault judgment was proper where statements of defendant demonstrated indifference
011
nw part, and lack of diligence in pursuing
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his opportunity to detwid. KussHl v Martell.
681 P 2d ll«J3 i Utah l!>X4i
Neither the Utah Foreign -Judgment Act,
$ 78-22a-l et seq.. nor this rule, permits a
court to set aside a foreign default judgment
because of alleged inadvertence, mistake, or
neglect absent a showing of fraud or the lack of
jurisdiction or due process in the rendering
state. Data Mgt. Sys. v. FDP Corp.. 709 P.2d
377 (Utah 1985).
Failure to reserve rights under $ 70A-3606(l)<aJ. which governs impairment of recourse or of collateral in regard to commercial
paper and does not apply to judgments, could
not be used to set aside default judgments
against debtors under Subdivision tbM6) of this
rule. First Sec. Bank v. Aarian Dev. Corp., 738
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987).
Illness.
Illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to
make neglect in failing to defend a cause of
action a ground for vacating a default judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah
416. 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
Inconvenience.
Mere inconvenience or the press of personal
or business affairs is not deemed as an excuse
for failure to appear at trial. Vallev Leasing v.
Houghton. 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983).
Merits of claim.
Usually, it is not appropriate on Subdivision
(b) motions to examine the merits of the claim
decided bv the default judgment. Larsen v.
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
Negligence of attorney.
An oral promise made by the attorney for the
plaintiff to the effect that defendant could have
more time in which to answer, where the plaintiff already had obtained a default judgment,
was now sufficient excusable neglect so as to
allow the vacation of the default judgment. The
defendants were deprived of nothing by the alleged promise inasmuch as tne default judgment had already been entered. Such a promise could in no way bind a client who already
had a judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
Where defendant's counsel withdrew at pretrial conference and defendant claimed it received no notice to appoint counsel and had no
notice of trial until it received notice of default
judgment, the default was set aside in the interest of justice, the court stating that where
there is doubt about whether a default should
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of doing so. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v.
Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980).
Where plaintiffs attorney and insurance adjuster for defendant's insurance company were
engaged in settlement talks at time plaintiffs
petition was filed, defendant was entitled to
relief from subsequent summary judgment on
grounds of "excusable neglect'' since plaintiffs
attorney had duty to notify adjuster of potential default and did not do so. Helgesen v.
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981).
Party may not claim his attorney's neglect in
failing to notify him of proceeding as grounds
for setting aside a default judgment where the
party has been negligent by not communicat-
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discharge.

Satisfaction,
Accord a n d satisfaction.
4 judgment defendant is nut constrained to
an alleged accord and satisfaction only as
r 1
* ttfirmative defense to further attempts bv a
J
V m e n t creditor to enforce the terms of a
A n i e n t . Rather, the i,„ue aia. he ra,M,i
d i k i n g direct judicial -auction «.l the satistacby motion or independent action pursuant
.'^Subdivision «bn6i. Sugarhouse r m . ( o . v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 19*0,.
When a judgment creditor accepted a promv*orv note with greater consideration and dif•Vrent performance from the earlier judgment,
*e released the judgment debtor from the judgment in an accord and satisfaction. Brimley v.
,;.i.~cr. 754 P.2d 97 .Utah Ut. App. 1988 >
—Discharging r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of e s t a t e
from further d e m a n d .
Relief under this rule is available with regard to an order under $ 75-3-1001 discharging a personal representative of an estate from
further claim or demand after a final order has
»*««*n entered. Morgan v. Zions N a t l Bank, 711
i'Jd 261 'Utah 1985).
—Erroneously included d a m a g e s .
Defendant, whose insurance company had
vitisfied judgment against him in automobile
tccident action which erroneously included
imounts plaintiff had received as PIP benefits
inder its insurance policy, could not seek to
r.odify judgment to exclude erroneously included amount by way of motion pursuant to
••ither Subdivisions <b)<6) or '7). Laub v. South
(\.«nt. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah
P.W2).
—Prospective a p p l i c a t i o n of j u d g m e n t .
Kule permitting relief from a judgment on
'he basis that it is no longer equitable that the
judgment have prospective application was inapplicable between the parties when the judgment had been satisfied by the party seeking
relief. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n,
*H P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982).
Timeliness of motion.
A motion to set aside a judgment that is
^ised on a reversed judgment must be made
*»thin a reasonable time. Guardian State
Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989).
—Confused mental condition of party.
There was no abuse of discretion in trial
court's denial of plaintiffs motion to vacate or'W dismissing action entered pursuant to re°ase and stipulation of parties where motion
*as filed six and one-half years after plaintiffs
Physician detected plaintiffs confused mental
•jmdition urged as basis for vacating motion,
toung v. Western Piling & Sheeting. 680 P.2d
-94 (Utah 1984).
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
where the evidence indicated that plaintiff
nad not gotten in touch with his attorney for
|wo years after filing complaint, it was proper
°r court to deny plaintiffs motion to set aside
a
judgment, dismissing his complaint for lack
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A trial court \ r< tasal to .-el aside a dismissal
fi»r failure i<> prosecute will not he overturned
absent .in abuse <>t'discretion. Meadow Fresh
Farms v. Utah Stale I'mv. Uept. of Agric, 813
P.2d 1216 -Utah Ut. App. 19911.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to -el aside a dismissal for failure to
prosecute, where the underlying events occurred in 19M. an initial action filed in 1983
was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the
instant action based on the >ame facts was not
filed until 1988. by which time many of the
potential witnesses might have moved out of
state and/or their recollection of the circumstances and events might have dimmed.
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ.
Dept. of Agric. 813 P.2d 1216 < Utah Ct. App.
1991).
—Fraud.
A cross-complaint seeking to set aside a
judgment for fraud in its procurement may be
brought after the time limit in Subdivision (b)
for a motion to set aside a judgment. Bowen v.
Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 11952).
Motion by ex-husband to order paternity
blood test to furnish evidence on possible modification of support decree, based on fraud on
court, was governed by time limit in this rule
and was too late when filed 14' j months after
divorce decree, even though baby was unborn
and blood test could not have been performed
before the divorce. McGavin v. McGavin. 27
Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972).
—Invalid s e r v i c e .
The three-months provision provided for in
Subdivision <b» for motions to vacate a judgment has no application to a judgment which is
void because of invalid service of summons.
Woody v. Rhodes. 23 Utah 2d 249. 461 P.2d 465
U969).
Where the judgment is void because of a
fatally defective service of process, the time
limitations of Subdivision tb) have no application. Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288 (Utah
1986).
—^Judicial error.
Where judgment contained no clerical error
amendable under Subdivision (a) but may have
contained judicial error, trial court erred in
granting motion to amend the judgment filed
nine years after judgment was entered, since
the error was not corrected by timely motion
for new trial, appeal or suit in equity. Richards
v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143
<1970).
—Jurisdiction.
In suit for injunction, wherein it appeared
that parties stipulated that hearing on damages be deferred and tried later, and court
made order that plaintiff might later file
amended or supplemental complaint with respect to issue of damages, district court did not
lose jurisdiction of case because damage issue
was not determined during term of court at
which injunction was granted and no application for relief "in furtherance of justice" was
made within six months after term. Utah Oil
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Aooealabilitv of order suspending
* ^ * ~ ^ e x e c u t i o n of sentence, ;>L

tfnu

4. Appeal as of right: when taken.

* * ^ oeal from final j u d g m e n t a n d o r d e r . In a case in which an appeal
** tt*d as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
4
^***^ aD peal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
thin 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
****^ H)wever, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
" ^ r unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
hg filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
^L of the judgment or order appealed from.
M Motions post j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r . If a timely motion under the Utah
<^-g*0f Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg•#«t4 under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
-*anjci of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be retxtwd »f the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
^Mment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
*rtjci ahall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
t i#nying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
%
4h Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
.«»gr Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgwctu aiTecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
ul parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant•* or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
^oaition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
t*m\ must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
•* order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided abcve.
c» Filing p r i o r to e n t r y of j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r . Except as provided in
•A/aflraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
^mon, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
atrial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
4> Additional o r c r o s s - a p p e a l . If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
*ftY, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
^ which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
^^•cnbed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
«* Extension of t i m e to a p p e a l . The trial court, upon a showing of excus'*•• neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
^ motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
'**cnbed by paragraph ta> of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
~*cnbed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
^ceof a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
' ne other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
^*tension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
* of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
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^ W 3 3 Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
J* 1 *
of attorney's fees.
•J*%1:":: _
s for d e l a y o r frivolous a p p e a l . Kxuepi in .1 first appeal of
^ ' P ^ ' 2 a B c r i n i i n a l case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
il?*
j e r these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it -hall award just
<
* * * a U n which may include single or double costs. ^ defined in Rule :-J4.
^ ^ ^ a s o n a b l e attornev fees, to the prevailing party The court may order
*** a f i t r C damages be paid by the party «>r by the party's attorney.
~~ Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
^f
r other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
*****
| a W ? o r not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
*'* --^existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
'V* urpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
**ass cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
^cfit only the party filing the appeal, motion, bneL or oiher paper.
c) P r o c e d u r e s .
ti) The court may award damages upon request ot any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10. as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order ro show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — Rule 33 .s
•ubtttantially redrafted to provide definitions
ad procedures for assessmg penalties L;r deivs and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to oe frivolous, the court
i u s t award damages. This is :n keeping with
Kule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the amount of damages — .-.ingle or
loubie costs or attorney lees or both — is left to
'he discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended
•0 make express the authority of the court to

impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Anders v. California. 386 US 738 «1967) and
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 ' U t a h 1981).
Under the law of the.-*? cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.

MOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
-Defined.
-Sanctions.
I'ited.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband s appeal from a judgment relatn
£ to aiimonv md distribution of marital
Property was (nv..l.u>. where there was no ba*'S for the argument presented and the evidence and law was miseharactenzed and misstated. Fames v Karnes. 735 P.lid 395 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiffs .'.i.in.M-l violated rule and was
therefore Mitv,,< t t... >.u;i!nui when, after he instigated
pl.imntt's
malpractice
action
gainst defendant orthodontist and found that
n
e could not pro\e breach of duty or causation.

the record was devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence showing negligence, and after losing on summary judgment, he persisted in filing an appeal. Hunt v Hurst. 785 P.2d 414
• Utah L9i)0>.
An appeal brought from an action that was
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under this rule. Utah IVp't of
Social Servs v. Adams. SOH P '2d 1193 ' U t a h
Ct. App. 1991).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal
is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis. Lack ot good faith is not required.
O'Brien v. Rush. ,'U P L\l 30« (Utah Ct. App.
I987f
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.
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Kule H-404

Shortening 90-day waiting period in domestic
matters.

A*403-

*£ blish a procedure ior shortening or waiving the 90-day waiting peH ^ d o m e s t i c cases.
|gcability:
H k rule shall apply to the district courts.
^ e n t of the R u l e :
l Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action shall not be heard by the
rid courts unless 90 days have elapsed from the time the complaint was
Aot unless the Court finds that there is good cause for shortening or
ainating the waiting period and enters a formal order to that effect prior to
i bearing date.
)> Application for a hearing less than 90 days from the date the complaint
^ filed shall be made by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting
*A the factual matters constituting good cause. The motion and supporting
idavit(s) shall be served on the opposing party at least five days prior to the
%gduled hearing unless the party is in default.
?3) In the event the Court finds that there is good cause for hearing in less
an 90 days from the filing of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause
ail be included in the findings of fact and presented to the Court for signa^.

tile 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees,
ifcnt:
To establish procedures for modification of existing divorce decrees.
pplicability:
i*his rule shall apply to all district courts.
titement of t h e R u l e :
U) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing
a petition to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition
d summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the rerements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a
nification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to show
ise.
2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after
?rvice of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial.
•pon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic
stations commissioner prior to trial, or in those districts where there is not a
—nestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar.
!
3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order
oshow cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district
udge.
;

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
thviifi*..*.v
SUPP rt
^ubiJct " ° ?
? ;
^oject matter jurisdiction.
Modification of support.
"jaintiff was required to file a petition to
Modify her divorce decree pursuant to this rule
*ten she sought to enforce, by order to show
•au«e, a provision in the decree that provided

that future child support would be automaticallv adjusted to reflect changes in income.
Such a provision violates § 78-45-7(1). which
provides that a child support order can only be
modified based upon a showing of a material
change in circumstances. Grover v. Grover,
839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Subject matter jurisdiction.
A district court other than the court issuing
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John Carl Putvinf

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 930359-CA
v.
Karen Larie Thompson,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court on appellants motion to
strike the affidavit of Arnold Gardner, which is attached to
appellees brief. In response, appellee suggests that the
affidavit may be stricken only if this court strikes those
portions of appellant's brief that appellee claims deviate from
the record. However, this court does not have before it an
appropriate or timely motion to strike any of appellant's brief,
yet it is clear that the affidavit at issue is not part of the
trial court record and, therefore, is not appropriately before
this court.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion to
strike is granted and this court will not consider either the
affidavit of Arnold Gardner, or references to it in appellee's
brief. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's request for
attorney fees is denied.
Dated this / Z^tTay of April, 1994.
IT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 1994, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Daniel Darger
Attorney at Law
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney at Law
349 South 200 East, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 12th day of April, 1994.

By -j/ttU

^ni0jiU.\)

Deputy Clerk
J

